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PREFACE 
The British parliamentary-cabinet system, which is characterized 
by the fusion of executive and legislative powers, is one of the two most 
imitated models in the contemporary world. It has produced a responsible 
type of legislative leadership in which the concentration of authority 
has been balanced by obligations of political accountability. The Prime 
Minister, in assuming the leadership of the Government and the House of 
Commons, must politically render an account of his public mandate to his 
party, to the House of Commons, and to the electorate. 
For the past three hundred years, the Prime Minister has gradually 
usurped the exercise of almost the totality of the formal constitutional 
powers still nominally vested in the Sovereign and in Parliament. 
Commencing from rather humble status as chief advisor to the monarchy and 
then undergoing transformation into the parliamentary agent and custodian 
over the Monarch, the Prime Minister has become the kingpin of the 
Government and Parliament. This transformation of the Prime Minister from 
the position of servant of the Crown and Parliament into master of both is 
the consequence of the formation of well-disciplined and highly-centralized 
political parties in Great Britain. Nowadays, he who commands the 
majority of the House of Commons commands Parliament and the Crown. 
"Nowhere in the wide world," said Mr. Gladstone, "does so great a 
substance cast so small a shadow; nowhere is there a man who has so much 
power, with so little to show for it in the way of formal title or 
iii 
prerogative. 111 Mr. Gladstone's statement still rings true. Although 
the Ministers of the Crown Act (Art. 4) provides a salary to the Prime 
Minister, there is no single line of written law which prescribes the 
sources of his legislative powers or of his executive powers. Oddly 
enough, he is the most powerful legislative leader in modern democratic 
states, The question arises, what are the main sources of his 
extraordinary legislative powers? The purpose of this thesis is to 
explore the scope of the Prime Minister's legislative authority in te.rms 
of his roles as the leader of majority party in the Commons, the head of 
the Cabinet, and as the leader of the House of Commons. 
The well-developed British party system has made the fusion of 
legislative and executive powers an outstanding feature of the British 
system of government. Standing at the apex of a disciplined party 
machine, the Prime Minister is the chief policy-maker in his party. This 
makes it possible for the Prime Minister to be the leader of the House of 
Commons. The Prime Minister, as the leader of the party in office, enjoys 
powers which formerly in the hands of hereditary monarchs might have been 
called tyrannical. 
Without an understanding of the British party system, the most 
important aspects of the legislative leadership role of the Prime Minister 
would be inexplicable. Basically, the functioning of the parliamentary 
democracy is also dependent upon the working of the British party system. 
While the British party system accords very great legislative authority to 
the Prime Minister, it simultaneously ensures responsible legislative 
leadership. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that 
lw. E. Gladstone, Gleanings of Past Years (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1879), Vol. I, p. 244. 
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party government as developed in Great Britain affords very great promise 
of rendering an account to the electorate. To put the matter in another 
way, the concentration of legislative leadership is matched in Great 
Britain by the concentration of responsibility. 
The methodology employed in the preparation of this thesis has been 
explanative and descriptive. While describing the relevant facts, we 
have fitted these facts into more complex terms of reference. The 
descriptive accounts have been intended to co~roborate certain assumptions. 
The proposed approach is, of course, one of several methodologies of 
inquiry. The examples which have been used to illustrate the legislative 
role of the Prime Minister provide concrete evidences. These examples 
have been culled from a representative pblltion of the voluminous literature 
consisting of state papers, newspapers, personal accounts of leading 
statesmen, biographies, and treatises and articles of leading scholars, 
I wish to tender my most grateful thanks to my major adviser, Dr. 
Clifford A. L. Rich, for his indefatigable efforts and patience in direct-
ing and assisting me in preparing this s,ttlyy, I must express my infinite 
gratitude to Dr. Bertil L. Hanson for his valuable criticisms and 
suggestions, I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Robert S. 
Walker for his stimulating counsel. Gratitude is also due to the staff 
of the Oklahoma State University Library for assistance in obtaining much 
of the relevant materials for the preparation of this thesis. 
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THE PRil1E MINISTER'S ROLE AS PARTY LEADER 
Prerogatives and Powers of the Party Leader 
Although it is true that the Prime-Minister-to-be is elected not 
as :such but as a Member of Parliament, convention has precribed that 
theileader of the majority shall, in fact, be the Prime Minister, The 
Prime Minister's role as Party Leader has essential importance to his 
legislative leadership role. While briefly describing how the Party 
Leader is selected, our chief concern is to show who is the chief policy-
maker in the party and why the policy of the party in office (i.e., 
Government policy) is enforceable in the House of Commons. 
The Intraparty Leadership Role of the Leader 
Each political party in Great Britain determines for itself the 
method by which its own Leader is chosen. In the Conservative Party, the 
Leader is nominally elected by the Conservative Members of Parliament, all 
officially endorsed prospective parliamentary candidates, and members of 
the National Executive Council. Since 1923, however, the Sovereign has 
actually appointed the Leader of the Conservative Party. Mr. Baldwin in 
1923, Mr. Chamberlain in 1937, Mr, Churchill in 1940, Mr. Eden in 1955, 
Mr. Macmillan in 1957, and Lord Home in 1963 became the teader of the 
Party after they had been already appointed Prime Minister, It is indeed 
exceedingly doubtful whether the rank-and-file of the Party would accept 
the person appointed by the Sovereign as their Leader if he were 
1 
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undesirable. The Leader remains in office until he dies or tenders his 
personal resignation, although, since 1900, four Conservative Leaders 
(Balfour in 1911, Austen Chamberlain in 1922, Neville Chamberlain in 1940, 
and Anthony Eden in 1957) were, in fact, forced to resign. Mr. Cht1:r;chill 
retired in April 1955, as the result of which Mr. Eden succeeded him as 
Leader of the Party. 
The Leader of the Conservative Party, in form as well as in reality, 
is the master of his party. He appoints the chief officials of the Con-
servative Central Office, the Chief Whip, the Chairman of the Conservative 
Research Department, the members of the Shadow Cabinet when the Party is 
in opposition, and the Deputy Leader of the Party. Formulation of party 
policy and disciplinary powers over Conservatives are also his prerogatives. 
The Annual Conference of the Conservative Party has been traditionally 
nothing more than an advisory body. It expects,to be listened to, but has 
no power of final decision. For instance, it has frequently urged that 
the House of Lords should be reformed, but no Conservative Government has 
supported the proposal. 1 Mr. Lain Macleod, the present Conservative 
ehairman, once described the Annual Conference as "in many way!J more of a 
rally than a conference. 11 2 
The Parliamentary Labor Party, which includes all Labor members of 
both Houses of Parliament, elects its Chairman or Leader at the beginning 
of each parliamentary session. Once the Leader is selected, he is generally 
re-elected, unless he retires or dies. The only real exception to this 
1R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (New York: St. Martin's, 
1955), p. 226. 
2Malcolm Shaw, "An American Looks at the Party Conference," Parlia-
mentary Affairs, 15 (1), Spring 1962, p. 205. 
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practice was the resignation of George Lansbury in 1935, when Mr. Attlee 
was elected to replace him. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, who succeeded Mr. Attlee 
after his retirement in 1955, died in January 1963; and Mr. Harold Wilson 
was elected Leader of the Party with 144 votes against 103 for George 
Brown. 3 
In the Labor Party, it theqretically remains true that the National 
Executive Committee, of which the Leader of the Party is an ex officio 
member, is the governing body. It appoints the principal officials of the 
Labor Central Office. The decision-making power of the Party and the 
disciplinary powers over the Party members are also formally vested in the 
National Executive Committee. The Attlee-Laski episode is a well-known 
case which did much to clarify the National Executive Committee's relation-
ship to the parliamentary leadership. When Mr. Attlee, the Chairman of 
the Parliamentary Party (1935-1955), had been invited by Mr. Churchill, 
the Prime Minister, to attend the Postdam Conference, Mr. Laski, the 
Chairman of the National Executive Committee, issued a statement declaring: 
It is, of course, essential that if Mr. Attlee attends this 
gathering he shall do so in the role of an observer only •.•. 
On the other hand, the Labour Party cannot be committed to 
any decisions arrived at, for the Three Power Conference will 
be discussing matters which have not been debated either in 
the part4 Executive or at meetings of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party •.. 
Mr. Churchill asked publicly what right the National Executive Committee 
had to subject Ministers of the Crown to its will and presumably to be told 
3Manchester Guardian WeeklY_, February 14, 1963, p. 4; and ibid., 
February 21, 1963, p. 2, 
4Kingsley Martin, Harold Laski (1893-1950): A Biographical Memoir 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1953), p. 160, 
secret information of the Government. 5 Mr. Attlee, for the Labor Party, 
replied: 
At no time, and in no circumstances, has the National Executive 
Connnittee ever sought to give instructions to the Parliamentary 
Labour Party arising out of the consultations, Indeed, as will 
be seen from the clause,6 it has no power to do so .. .7 
The parliamentary leadership of the Labor Party, like that of the Con-
servative Party, is not subject to the Annual Conference either. For 
instance, on October 4, 1960, the Scarborough Conference passed a reso-
4 
lution stating that the Conference firmly supported the unilateral unclear~ 
disarmament to which Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of the Party, and his 
followers were opposed. Another resolution of the Conference asserted 
that the policy of the Labor Party in Parliament must be determined by 
the Annual Conference, Mr. Gaitskell successfully declined to accept the 
two resolutions.a 
It is sometimes assumed that the policy of the party in power is 
determined by the Cabinet; and that the other Ministers of the Cabinet 
are equally responsible to the House of Commons and thus have an equal 
personal stake in the Government's policy. This seems not quite true, 
The Prime Minister, as the Leader of the.party in office, has preponderant 
weight in the policy-making process of the Cabinet, He is much more than 
primus inter pares. 
5Herbert Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed. (London, New 
York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, p. 141. 
611To confer with the Parliamentary Labour Party at the opening of each 
parliamentary session, and at any· other time when it or the Parliamentary 
Party may desire a conference on any matters relating to the work and process 
of the party." See: Ibid. , p. 143. 
7Ibid, 
8 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, January 24, 1963, p. 5. 
5 
In theory, the Sovereign is the presiding officer of British Cabinet 
meetings; but the Prime Minister has actually presided over the Cabinet 
meeting for about 250 years. The Cabinet meeting assemblE,as at the behest 
of the Prime Minister, and discusses only such subjects as he permits to 
come before it. The Cabinet Secretariat, under the direction of the Prime 
Minister, prepares the agenda. The Prime Minister is entitled to refuse 
to discuss any matter which is not on the agenda. Regular meetings of the 
Cabinet are held once a week. Special meetings are convened at the call 
of the Prime Minister. Cabinet Ministers are ex officio members of the 
Cabinet meeting. Non-cabinet Ministers may attend the Cabinet meeting 
only on the invitation of the Prime Minister. Usually a Cabinet meeting 
is not followed by a vote. Lord Amery has held: "I have never myself 
known a vote asked for by another member of the Cabinet."9 The Prime 
Minister collects and interprets the general sense of his colleagues. If 
he sums up a discussion in very definite words, the summary itself is the 
decision. The final decision actually belongs to the Prime Minister. 
Accordingly, the old estimate10 that the Prime Minister was primus inter 
pares must be rejected as nonsense. Mr. Chamberlain (Prime Minister, 
1937-1940) has insisted: 
The ultimate responsibility of the final decision must rest upon 
the shoulders of the Prime Minister. No major point of policy 
can be decided, no real fateful step can be taken without the 
9L, S. Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, 2nd ed. (London, New 
York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 73. 
lOAlfred George Gardiner, The Life of William Harcourt (London: 
Constable, 1923), Vol. II, p. 610; Johnl1orley, Walpole (London and 
New York: Macmillan, 1889); and Herman Finer, Theory and Practice 
of Modern Government, rev. ed. (New York: Hold, Rinehart and Winston, 
1960), p. 590. 
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assent, either active or passive, of the Prime Minister, ••• 
I believe it is that ultimate and inescapable responsibility 
which is the real root of the anxieties which have worn down 
the energies of our recent Prime Ministers,11 
Mr. Churchill (Prime Minister, 1940-45, and 1951-1955) has stated: 
In any sphere of action there can be no comparison between 
the position of number one and number two, three, or four •••. 
It is always a misfortune when number two, or three has to 
initiate a dominant plan or policy. He has to consider not 
only the merits of the policy, but the mind of his chief; 
not only what to advise, but what it is proper for him in 
his station to advise; not only what to do, but how to get 
it done .• 11 The loyalties which center upon number one are 
enormous, 
Mr. Eden (Prime Minister, 1955-57) has also asserted: 
A Prime Minister is still nominally primus inter pares, but in 
fact his authority is stronger than that. The right to 
choose his colleagues, to ask for a dissolution of Parliament 
and, if he is a Conservative, to appoint the chairman of the 
party organization, add up to a formidable total power,13 
No longer can it be said, if it ever could be in the nineteenth century, 
that the Prime Minister is primus inter pares. 
Disciplinary Powers over Members of Parliament 
The central explanation of why the policy of the party in office is 
enforceable in the House of Commons rests mainly on the fact that the 
Prime Minister has prominent disciplinary powers over party representatives 
and Ministers of the Crown, However, unless carefully watched, the term 
"party discipline in Great Britain" may be misleading. 
Withdrawal of the party whip from a Member of Parliament (i.e., 
11Neville Chamberlain, In Search of Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1939), p. 3 . 
12winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1949) , p. 15. 
13 
Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 297. 
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cessation of sending a Member of Parliament the whips' notices) has 
analogy to the Member's excommunication. If a Member of Parliament is 
deprived of his party whip, he can expect normally that he will be de-
feated at the next parliamentary election, unless he is a man of im-
por,tance who can win sympathy in his party at large and he has over-
whelming support in his constituency party. For example, Mr. Bevan, 
from whom the party whip was withdrawn in March 1955 and to whom it was 
restored before the 1955 parliamentary election, would probably have been 
returned for Ebbw Vale in the election even if he had been forced to 
stand as an independent Labor candidate, because he really had considerable 
sympathy within his local party and constituency~ When the party whip 
was withdrawn from Mr. Bevan, a vote of "complete confidence" in Mr. 
Bevan was passed unanimously by the General Management Cormnittee of his 
constituency party. The meeting of the Committee, to which Mr. Bevan 
gave full report, also gave its unanimous opinion that "the whip should 
not have been withdrawn and should be restored irmnediately. 11 14 
In the Conservative Party, the party whip is withdrawn by the Party 
Leader on the pr9posal of the Chief Whip. The party whip is not withdrawn 
unless a member is seriously at odds with the Party. For instance, the 
party whip was withdrawn from Captain Cunningham Reid for his independent 
approach, but two years previously he had refused a request from his 
constituency party to resign. 15 In recent years, no Conservative has been 
subject to this measure. 
1~anchester Guardian, April 4, 1955, p. 1. 
l5Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members: A Study of the British 
Backbencher (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 151. 
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There is much evidence to show that the discipline of the Conserva-
tive Party generally projects the image of tolerance. For rather special 
reasons, Viscount Hinchingbrooke announced during the Connnons debate on 
the German peace treaties that he would abstain from voting for German re-
h . h h' . d 16 armament, tow ic is party was connnitte • During the period of the 
Suez Crisis (1956), Sir Frank Madlicott wrote to Prime Minister Eden saying 
that unless the Government could indicate their willingness to act upon 
the United Nations resolution calling on Britain and France to withdraw 
innnediately from Egypt he could no longer support the Government. Colonel 
Cyril Banks, who had been very critical of the Government's policy regard-
ing Egypt from the beginning of the Suez Crisis, informed his constituents 
of his decision to renounce the Government Whip and to bec~me an independent. 
Both Sir Medlicott and Colonel Banks were known to have abstained in the 
voting that followed the debate of November 8, 1956. 17 When the Anglo-
Egyptian Agreement was presented by the Government to the Connnons, the 
''Suez Group" spoke openly against the Government. Mr. Antony Head, 
Secretary of State for War, warned them that "if they voted against the 
Government they would find that they had not merely voted against their 
own party but, in my opinion a more serious matter, against their own 
connnon sense." In spite of his warning, they still voted against the a-
greement, which was carried by a vote of 257 to 26. 18 In April 1963, the 
Minister of Education, Sir Edward Boyle, got a second reading for a Bill 
which would enable him to set aside the award for increases in teachers' 
16House · of Connnons, Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 504, cols. 1, 905-
1,913 (henceforth 504 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1,905-1;913). 
17The Times (London), November 9, 1956, p. 10. 
18531 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 723-822. 
9 
Ray made by the official negotiating machinery, the Burham Connnittee. 
On second reading, the Government majority fell from about the normal 
100 to 60. Mr. T •. L. Iremonger, a Conservative Member of Parliament, 
voted against the Government and others abstained. The abstainers in-
eluded Mr. J.C. Jennings who was himself a member of the National Union 
of Teachers. 19 In the vote on the Government's handling of the security 
aspects of the Profumo scandal, twenty-seven Conservatives abstained 
from voting for the Government. 20 No disciplinary action was taken 
against these rebels. 
By contrast, the discipline of the Labor Party generally projects 
the image of severity. For instance, when the Parliamentary Labor Party 
by a vote of 124 to 72 decided to abstain from voting on the ratification 
of the London and Paris Agreements, seven Labor Members of Parliament 
f ·1 d b . All d · d f h h" 21 a1. e to a stain. were epr1.ve o t e party w 1.p. The apparent 
severity of the Labor Party's discipline does not prevent occasional 
acts of mass rebellion. For example, when Mr. Beswick moved a new clause 
to the Atomic Energy Bill designed to prevent the new Atomic Energy 
Authority from producing nuclear weapons unless authorized by both Houses 
of Parliament, sixty-five Labor Members, contrary to the advice of their 
22 
leaders, supported the proposed clause. On March 3, 1955, sixty-two 
Labor Members abstained from voting for the official Opposition amendment 
19 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 2, 1963, p. 4; and The Times (London), 
April 26, 1963, p. 11. 
20 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 20, 1963, p. 2. 
21Leslie Hunter, The Road to Brighton Pier (London: Arthur Barker, 
1959), p. 84. 
22526 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 1,795. 
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on defense. Five of them who voted for the party'' s amendment did not 
vote in the second division against the Government. The abstainers in-
eluded the six rebels from whom the party whip was withdrawn in December 
1954 for voting against party instructions and to whom it was restored in 
Febroary 1955 on a pledge to abide by the Constitution and the Standing 
Orders of the Parliamentary Labor Party. 23 No party whip was withdrawn 
from the rebels either in the Atomic Energy Bill issue or in the defense 
issue. 
The image of tolerance in the Conservative Party is also seen by the 
fact that the Conservative Members of Parliament can "resign the whip" as 
a means of protest. For instance, on May 13, 1957, eight Conservatives 
forsook the party whip because they were opposed to the re-entry of 
24 
British ships in the Suez Canal. This practice is absolutely intoler-
able in the Labor Party. It is very interesting to note that backbench 
rebellions have been more connnon in the Labor Party than in the Conserva-
tive Party. According to Mr. W. L. Guttsman, Manchester Guardian 
political correspondent during 1945-1954, twelve major Labor rebellions 
and 213 Labor Members of Parliament were involved in one or more inci-
dents. 25 In May 1949, five Parliamentary Private Secretaries voted 
against the Government on the Connnittee stage of the Ireland Bill. Four 
of them were asked to resign. Another resigned his office before he was 
requested to do so.26 In April 1954, three Labor whips voted for an 
23Manchester Guardian, March 4, 1955, p. 1. 
24New York Times, May 14, 1957, pp. 1-2. 
25w. L. Guttsman, "The Labour Rebels: An Analysis of Divisions," 
Manchester Guardian, April 14, 1955, p. 6. 
26A. B. Keith, The British Cabinet, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1952), p. 82.-
11 
d h A · E B"ll · h · 1 d ' · h -26 -a amen ment tote tomic nergy i against t eir ea ers wises. 
This was ironic since Parliamentary Private Secretaries and Party Whips 
are supposed to be among the best party men. 
In the Labor Party, the party whip can be withdrawn by the 
Parliamentary Labor Party on the recommendation of the Parliamentary 
Conunittee and with the approval of the National Executive Conunittee. This 
rather complicated practice was well illustrated in the case involving 
Mr. Aneurin Bevan on the defense issue. 
Mr. Bevan had many disputes with his party. The most famous one 
arose in March 1955. The issue concerned the Government's tjlotion to ap-
prove its policy of British manufacture of hydrogen bombs. The official 
Opposition moved an amendment which approved the Government's policy but 
criticized the deficiencies of the Services after a three-year expenditure 
27 of some 4,000,000,000 pounds. At the end of the two-day debate on the 
issue, Mr. Bevan asked the Opposition Front Bench whether hydrogen bombs 
would be used against an attack by conventional forces at any point. This, 
he said, would result in Britain's extinction, He challenged Mr. Attlee 
to say that this was not Labor's policy and declared that if Attlee failed 
to do so he would not vote for the amendment. 2-8 Five minutes before Mr. 
Bevan started his speech the Shadow Cabinet had begun its weekly meeting, 
so that ·none of the Labor Front Bench was there to hear his question and 
his threat. The Shadow Cabinet sat down after less than half ah hour with-
out having mentioned Bevan's point at all, After the meeting, Mr. Attlee 
26-aPeter G. Richards, p.-146. 
27537 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 1,917. 
28rbid., cols. 2,118-2,119. 
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made a short speech to the Commons. As Mr. Attlee finished, Mr. Bevan 
demanded once more to be told if the amendment associated the Labor Party 
with a policy of using hydrogen bombs even if they were not used against 
Britain, to which Mr. Attlee did not give a direct answer.29 When the.vote 
came on the Opposition's amendment, sixty-two Labor members abstained. 
The questions put by Mr. Bevan to Mr. Attlee and the number of ab-
stentions constituted an extraordinary challenge to the authority of the 
party leadership and an overt demonstration of the rift within the party. 
Effective leadership and good team work become impossible if all the time 
the party leadership has to face disruption from within. Very naturally, 
such an incident could not pass unheeded. 
On March 7, the Parliamentary Committee by a vote of nine to four, 
decided that the withdrawal of the party whip was the proper course to 
recommend. 30 Mr. Bevan accused the Parliamentary Committee of attempting 
an act of political assassination after he had issued a statement in which 
he said: 
I wish to make quite clear that what I have said or done is not 
a challenge to the personal authority and position of Mr. Attlee 
as Leader of the Party. Differences are on policy and policy 
only. 31 
Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Committee's recommendation that the party 
whip had to be withdrawn from Mr. Bevan was carried by a vote of 141 to 
32 112 by the Parliamentary Labor Party. At the meeting of the National 
Executive Committee on March 23, Mr. Attlee strongly insisted that Mr. Bevan 
29rbid., col. 2,176. 
30Manchester Guardian, March 11, 1955, p. 1. 
31rbid., March 14, 1955, p. l; and Ibid., March 17, 1955, p. 1. 
32 Ibid. 
13 
should not be expelled at once but should be asked instead to give satis-
factory promises of good behavior in the future. His proposal was 
carried by a majority of fourteen to thirteen. 33 Mr. Bevan made a con-
0 
cession and apologized in fairly generous words. In his published 
statement on March 29, 34 he said that he was "sincerely sorry" and wished 
to apologize to Mr. Attlee "for any pain I may have caused him." He also 
professed that>he had not intended to embarrass his leader. He added that 
he "asked for nothing more than the opportunity to serve" the Labor move-
ment under Attlee's leadership, and that he was willing to accept all 
qbligations which wer,e common to members of the Party. On March 30, the 
National Executive Committee, through a resolution which was passed by a 
vote of sixteen to seven, stated that the withdrawal of the party whip by 
the Parliamentary Labor Party was fully justified and, "whilst noting the 
assurances given by Mr. Bevan ••• , warns that it will take drastic action 
against future violations of party discipline. 1135 
The most drastic disciplinary action against rebels is to expel them 
from their party. If a Member of Parliament is no longer a member of a 
party the party whip is automatically withdrawn. No Conservative Member 
has ever suffered formal expulsion. By contrast, in the Labor Party, there 
is nothing new to the practice of expulsion. 
In the Labor Party, unlike the Conservative Party, the right of ex-
pulsion from the party is not formally vested in the Leader, but in the 
National Executive Committee. Mr. MacDonald and those who followed him 
33Ibid., March 24, 1955, p. 1. 
34Ibid., March 31, 1955, p. 1. 
35Ibid. 
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into the National Government (i.e., Mr. Philip Snowden, Mr. J. H. Thomas, 
and Lord Sankey) were all expelled from the party by the National Executive 
Committee. 36 Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. G. R. Strauss, 
and Sir Charles Trevelyan were expelled from the party by the Committee as 
the consequence of advocating a "Popular Front" with Communists and other 
Left-wing groups. 37 Mr. Alfred Edwards, in an article in The London Even-
ing Standard, once wrote: 
Nationalization may be emotionally right. If you advocate it, 
you can make plenty of stirring speeches about taking the profit 
motive out of industry and so on. But the fact is that national-
ization does not work. It does not produce better results than 
free enterprize. It produces worse results. Socialists used to 
believe (before they tried it) that nationalization would 
deliver the goods. Well, experience shows that they were wrong. 
Thereupon, the Committee expelled him from the party. 38 
Disciplinary Powers~ Ministers of the Crown 
The Prime Minister's disciplinary power over Ministers of the Crown 
is largely based on the convention of collective responsibility. The 
members of the Cabinet must speak with one voice to the public, although 
several voices are permitted to be heard in the Cabinet meeting. This has 
been well illustrated by the cynical dictum of Lord Melbourne (Prime 
Minister, 1835-1841): "It does not matter what we say, but we must say 
the same thing. 11 39 If any member of the Cabinet, after a decision has 
36Reginald Bassett, Nineteen Thirty-one Political Crisis (London: 
Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's, 1958), pp. 265-267. 
37G. D. H. Cole,~ History of the British Labour Party from 1914 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 357-359. 
38Ray Victor, How~ Election Was Won (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), 
pp. 202-203. 
39Herbert H. Asquith, Fifty Years of British Parliament (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1926), Vol. II, p. 216. 
I I ' 
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been reached, feels that the outcome is absolutely incompatible with his 
personal convictions, it is his d~ty to resign. Even non-Cabinet Ministers 
are morally required to conform to this practice. 
The convention actually operates in this way. "Under all ordinary 
circumstances," said Sir Robert Peel (Prime Minister, 1841-1846), "if 
there were a ~erious difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and 
one of his colleagues, and that difference could not be reconciled by an 
amicable undersianding, the result would be retirement of the colleague, 
not of the Prime Minister. 1140 There have been a lot of precedents which 
indicate this practice. 
Mr. Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned his office 
as the consequence of his disagreement with Prime Minister Chamberlain's 
f . 1' 41 ore1.gn po 1.cy. For the same reason, Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, also resigned from his post. When he resigned on February 
20, 1938, he gave this explanation: "The Prime Minister has strong views 
on foreign policy and I ·respect him for it. I have strong views too. 1142 
In April ~951, Mr. Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, resigned from 
Mr. Attlee's Government with Mr. Bevan, Minister of Labor, and Mr. John 
Freeman, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply over the re-
43 
armament program and the impositruon of Health Service charges. During 
the Suez Crisis (1956), Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign 
40A. B. Keith, pp. 82-83. 
41winston s. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1948), pp. 324-325. 
42 332 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 49. 
43 Clement Attlee, As It Happened (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), 
p. 289. 
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Affairs, and Mr. Edward Boyle, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, re-
signed from Mr. Eden's Government because of disagreement with the govern-
ment's policy of intervention in Egypt. In his letter of resignation, Mr. 
Nutting stated: "I have advised most strongly against the decisions and 
actions of the Government, I do not honestly feel it is possible for me 
d f d h G I d • • 1144 to e en t e overnment s ec1s1on, Mr. Boyle's letter of resigna-
tion read in part as follows: 
I fully realize the very great difficulty of the problem which 
the Government has had to face in the Middle East, But I do 
not honestly feel that I can defend, as a Minister, the recent 
policy of the Government, and I feel bound to associate myself 
with that body of opinion which deeply deplored what has been 
done,45 
Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, resigned in 1957 because 
of his opposition to the release of Archbishop Makarios in March by Mr. 
Macmillan's Government. 46 
Should a dissentient Minister refuse to resign, the Prime Minister 
would be entitled to dismiss him. "The first essential for a Prime Minis-
ter," Mr. Herbert H. Asquith (Prime Minister, 1908-1915) repeated Mr. 
Gladstone's words to Mr. Chruchill, "is to be a good butcher, 1147 Mr. Attlee 
(Prime Minister, 1945-1951) said that the Prime Minister not only should 
choose Ministers by himself but also that he must always warn them: "If 
you don't turn out all right I shall sack you." He went on to say, "I 
44The Times (London), November 5, 1956, p. 4. 
45The Times (London], November 9, 1956, p. 15. 
46F. S, Northedge, "British Foreign Policy and the Party System," 
American Political Science Review, 54 (3), September 1960, p. 641, 
47winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1937), p. 117. 
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did with all my Ministers. 1148 However, there is not any concrete case 
which indicates the pr:actice of dismissal. It must be added that the 
Prime Minister cannot risk frequent resignations or dismissals, or weak 
support of policy by his ministerial colleagues on the floor of the House 
of Connnons, for that might endanger the solidarity of his party. This 
has rarely happened, but the Prime Minister must assume that it could 
happen. 
The Prime Minister's disciplinary power over Ministers of the Crown 
is further assured by his exclusive power to appoint Ministers. His 
senior colleagues may be consulted and the Sovereign may give advice; but 
the decision is his and his alone. When Mr. Churchill asked Mr. Lloyd 
George (Prime Minister, 1916-1922) the names of the other prospective 
Cabinet Ministers before he had joined the Cabinet, Lloyd George replied: 
"Surely that is an unprecedented demand. The choice of Members of the., 
Government must be left to the Prime Minister, and anyone who does not trust 
his leaders has but one course, and that is to seek leaders whom he can 
trust. 1149 Mr. Attlee held much the same view: 
In my view, the responsibility of choosing the members of the 
Government must rest solely with the Prime Minister, though in 
practice he will consult his colleqgues. If he cannot be 
trusted to exercise this power in the best interest of the 
nation and the party without fear, favour, or affection, he is 
not fit to be Prime Minister.SO 
Subject to limitations imposed by political exigencies, the Prime 
Minister virtually appoints all Ministers of the Crown, However, the 
exercise of this power of appointment is very intricate, for the Prime 
48 D. J. Heasman, "The Ministerial Hierarchy," Parliamentary Affairs, 
15 (2), Summer 1962, p. 321. 
49 
Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George--His Life and Times 
(New York, Toronto, and London: MacGraw-Hill, 1955), p. 495. 
50 
Clement Attlee, p. 219. 
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Minister should select senior Ministers who are fully willing to work as 
members of the team, and junior Ministers who wish to give whole-hearted 
support to their political superiors. Mr. Churchill pointed out that the 
Ministers of the Crown had "to be fitted in like a jigsaw puzzle. 1151 Mr. 
Attlee also commented: "The choosing of Ministers is the most difficult 
of all tasks which fall to the lot of a Prime Minister. 1152 
Ultimate Sanctions~ Party Members 
Strict party discipline in the House of Commons is, in part, due to 
the British nomination system. The selection of a candidate for a 
parliamentary election is the most important right of the local party. 
This does not mean that the local party has a free hand to make a choice. 
Both party headquarters reserve the ultimate right to veto, as they reserve 
the right to suggest, a candidate. For instance, the General Management 
Committee of the constituency Labor party in the Exchange Division of 
Liverpool decided by a vote of forty to thirty-nine not to confirm Mrs. E. 
M. Braddock as their candidate. After the National Executive Committee 
held a general inquiry into the issue, it instructed the General Management 
Committee to confirm Mrs. Braddock. A further meeting of the Committee was 
attended by Mr. Reg Wallis, area organizer of the National Executive Com-
mittee. He told the assembled delegates that no threat of expulsion had 
been made, but made it clear that, if necessary, a new constituency party 
would be formed from those who supported Mrs. Braddock. Thereupon, she 
was confirmed by thirty-one votes to seven. Before the vote for confir-
mation was put, there was a resolution of protest which was passed by a 
51winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 11 ff. 
52 Clement Attlee, p. 217. 
vote of thirty-seven to twenty-six, The resolution read: 
This constituency Labour party protests strongly against 
the conduct of the recent inquiry of the National Execu-
tive Committee and the decision that we are instructed to 
accept Mrs, Braddock. 
One o.f the assembled delegates, who had abstained from voting, corn-
plained: "It was selection by force and if that is democracy, I'll eat 
my hat! 1153 
The disciplinary powers of the Party Leader over the Members of 
Parliament of his party are greatly enhanced by the relationship of a 
Member of Parliament and his constituency. The Suez Crisis (1956) well 
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indicates this relationship, and illustrates that obedience is an indis-
pensable "virtue" of a Member of Parliament. 
On Novernb,er 8, 1956, eight Conservative Members of Parliament, in-
eluding Mr. Nigel Nicolson, Mr. Anthony Nutting, Sir Frank Medlcott, Sir 
Edward Boyle, Mr. J. J. Astor, Sir Robert Roothby, Colonel Banks, and Mr. 
William Yates, abstained from voting for the Suez policy of the Eden 
Government, None of them had the whip withdrawn. Six days later, the 
Constituency Meeting of the Conservative Association in Bournemouth East 
and Christchu.rch, from which Mr. Nicolson had been elected, passed a motion 
(by 198 votes to 92) in the following terms: 
This meeting regrets that it has no further confidence in the 
intention of Mr. Nigel Nicolson adequately to represent in 
Parliament the political views of Bournemouth East and Christchurch 
53Manchester Guardian, April 14, 1955, p. 2; and ibid., April 29, 1955, 
p. 1. In March 1949, Mr. L. J. Solley, a Labor Member of Parliament, was 
selected again by his constituency Labor party to be the prospective parlia-
mentary candidate, Mr. Solley's activities and attitudes in the Commons 
had been very distasteful to the party·leaders. Thus, he was not merely 
rejected as the Labor prospective parliamentary candidate, but expelled 
from the party by the National Executive Committee, which immediately in-
structed the constituency party to select another prospective Labor can-
didate, See: Cf. R. T. McKenzie, p. 528, 
Conservatives, and instructs the Executive Council to take 
steps to obtain a prospective Conservative candidate to 
contest the constituency at the next parliamentary election. 54 
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Although Mr. Nicolson initially refused to resign, he was eventually forced 
to resign by a ballot (3,767 to 3,671) of Conservative voters in his con-
stituency.55 On November 14, 1956, Mr. Anthony Nutting also resigned his 
parliamentary seat at the request of his Conservative constituency party. 56 
On October 30, when the Labor Party attacked Mr. Eden's Anglo-French 
ultimatum, Mr. Stanley Evans, a Labor Member of Parliament, spoke against 
his part_y lei3.ders' decision to divide the Commons and then subsequently 
abstained from voting against the Government. He also proclaimed that his 
· position was different from his party's, and again, in spite of the three-
line whip, abstained from voting. 57 His Labor constituency party asked 
for his resignation after a meeting on November 19. The resolution of the 
special meeting, which was "strongly condemning" of his action in the 
Commons, was passed unanimously.58 
The Candidate is elected neither because of his personality nor because 
54Nigel Nicolson, People and Parliament (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1958), p. 149. The Executive Council of Central Norfolk Con-
servative and Liberal Association also passed a resolution dissociating 
themselves from the views on the Suez Crisis expressed by Sir Frank 
Medlcott, Member of Parliament for the constituency. See: The Times 
(London), November 17, 1956, p. 3. The Executive Committee of the 
Handsworth Division Conservative and Unionist Association also issued a 
statement expressing their disagreement with Sir Edward Boyle, Member of 
Parliament for Hansworth. See: Ibid. 
55Geoffrey Marshall and Graeme C. Moodie, Some Problems of the Con-
stitution, rev. ed. (London: Hutchinston University Press, 1961), ~189. 
56The Times (London), November 15, 1956, p. 6. 
57558 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1,278, 1,681-1,686. 
58The Times (London), November 21, 1956, p. 6. 
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of his judgment or capacity, but because of his party label .. The 
personality, judgment, and capacity of the candidate have little to do 
with his success in the parliamentary election, The elctorate votes for 
a set of ideas with which the Prime Minister and his colleagues are 
associated, not for a specific candidate, who is rarely the "favorite 
son" of his constituency. It -ef.Tas reported that one voter had said: "He 
would vote for a pig if it ran as a Labour candidate, 1159 If under certain 
circumstances, a Member of Parliament feels deeply that he should vote in 
accordance with his "conscience" at the expense of the wishes of his party 
leaders, he actually votes against "the conscience of his constituency." 
He is expected by his constituency to be a good party man. In other words, 
if he votes against his party policy, he does not a.ct in accord with his 
raison d'etre. Very naturally, he should be replaced by someone who wishes 
to act in accordance with his raison d'etre. Mr •. Attlee explained the situ-
ation in the following words: 
A Labour candidate stands for certain definite principles, and 
is supported by men and women who have chosen him ••• to carry 
out these principles. They have, therefore, the right to ex-
pect that he will faithfully carry them out, As a matter of 
fact, that pledge is only an explicit avowal of the discipline 
which is necessary for all effective work in Parliament by a 
political party.60 
Accordingly, a dissentient Member of Parliament is morally required 
to resign his parliamentary seat. In March 1955, for example, Sir Richard 
Acland, who had won the historic Gravesen by-election (1947) after the 
expulsion of Garry Alligan from Parliament, announced that he would 
59william G. Andrews, "Three Electoral Colleges," Parliamentary 
Affairs, 14 (1), Spring 1961, p. 181. 
60clement Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective _(London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1937), p. 108. 
resign from the Labor Party and from Parliament to fight a new by-
election on the issue of the manufacture of hydrogen bombs in Great 
Britain. He told the General Management Connnittee of his constituency 
party that he could not compromise on the issue. 61 
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The Prime Minister's power of dissolution is an effective weapon in 
enforcing party discipline over Members of Parliament of his party. Unless 
the Members of Parliament of the party in office are prepared to throw 
out the Government as a whole, and to submit to the trouble and expense of 
a parliamentary election, it is inexpedient for them to vote against the 
Government. Since 1833, according to Professor William G. Andrews, the 
Prime Ministers have requested the dissolution of Connnons thirty-one 
62 
times, seventeen times of which they lost office. 
In recent years the power of dissolution has not been actually re-
sorted to as a means to maint?in party unity because no Prime Minister 
desires to go the country with a disunited front, which would create an 
impression that h.is party is no longer competent to govern the country. 
Nevertheless, it is an ultimate weapon to retain the support of a parlia-
mentary majority. It was reported that during the Profumo scandal the 
threat of innnediate dissolution of the Connnons, if necessary, could be used 
63 as final means of ensuring party loyalty. Mr. Attlee once told Professor 
William G. Andrews that the power of dissolution is "essential" for main-
64 
taining party discipline in the Connnons. 
61see 30. 
62 · 11 · A d " h h h P f n· 1 · " Wi iam G. n rews, Some T oug ts on t e ower o isso ution, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 13 (2), Sunnner 1960, p. 289. 
63New York Times, June 16, f963, p. 5. 
64william G. Andrews, p. 286. 
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There has been one major instance of the threat of dissolution 
having received much publicity. When a new Education Bill (1944) was 
under consideration, an amendment calling for equal pay for'men and women 
' 
teachers, proposed by Mrs. Cazalet Keit, the Conservative member for East 
Islington, won widespread support from her colleagues. The Government, 
however, had been greatly opposed to the amendment which was passed by .a 
65 
vote of 117 to 116. Prime Minister Churchill announced to the Conunons 
that unless the Conunons reversed itself, "this act of deletion will be 
regarded as a Vote of Confidence in the present Administration. If the 
Government does not secure an adequate majority, it will entail the usual 
66 constitutional consequences." It was understood that the term "the 
usual constitutional consequences" means either dissolution of the Conunons 
or resignation of the Government. Those Conservative Members of Parlia-
ment who had voted for the amendment did reverse themselves. Mrs. Keit's 
short speech to the Conunons explained rather clearly why they voted for 
the Government at the ·expense of their "conscience." She said: 
The Prime Minister had felt no possible course open to us other 
than to support him in this Vote of Confidence. I shall vote 
against the Clause embodying my own amendment, not because my 
views have changed on equal pay, but because more vital issues 
have been superimposed upon it. In this great democracy of 
ours, convention for once, se€eys to have .overruled conunon sense. 
I believe in the Clause as it stands, but I shall vote against 
it to show my measureless confidence in the Prime Minister now, 
in view of the stupendous days that lie ahead.67 
It used to be assumed that the question of dissolution was always sub-
mitted to the Cabinet for ultimate decision. This assumption is far from 
65398 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1358, 1390. 
66Ibid., col. 1452. 
67 
Ibid., cols. 1588-1589. 
being true, Mr. Churchill has written: "The right of recommending a 
dissolution to the Crown rests solely with the Prime Minister. 1168 Mr. 
Attlee, in 1950, decided to dissolve the Commons by himself. Lord 
Morrison, the Deputy Prime Minister in Mr. Attlee's Government, wrote: 
I opposed the proposal for an election as early as possible 
in the New Year, I wanted it later .... The final decision 
rested, of course, with the P.M .••. Before the Christmas 
holidays no definite decision had been made, Ministers left 
official business for a day or two •... It was in this period 
that Attlee took the final decision,69 
In 1951, the decision was again Mr. Attlee's}O Mr. Eden, in April 1955, 
also decided to request a dissolution by himself,71 It remains true 
that the Prime Minister may, if he wishes, discuss the question of 
24 
dissolution with his leading colleagues, but the decision is his and his 
alone. 
Responsibilities of the Party Leader 
The Prime Minister's strength in the Commons stems fundamentally 
from the fact that he is the real leader of a highly-centralized and well-
disciplined majority party, Does this, in turn, mean that he can remain 
in office without assuming any responsibility to his party? The Norwegian 
Campaign (1940), the Suez Incident (1956), and the Profumo Affair (1963) 
illustrate that ineffective. leadership can impose detrimental effects upon 
not only the Prime Minister's political fortunes but also the political 
image of his party as a whole. The Lansbury Case (1935) further indicates 
68winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 
1f5,3) , p. 589. 
69 
Lord Morrison of Lambeth, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London: 
Odhams, 1960), p. 286, 
70 b"d 283 I1..,p .. 
71 
Anthony Eden, pp. 298-301. 
25 
that the Party Leader who finds himself unable to conform to the general 
feeling of his party must "retire." 
The Norwegian Campaign 
Mr. Neville Chamberlain succeeded Mr. Stanley Baldwin as Prime 
Minister on May 28, 1937. Then Great Britain was already feeling rather 
badly the need for a Prime Minister who could answer the dictators in a 
style as effective as their own. But Mr. Chamberlain was incompetent to 
do so. Accordingly, he was forced to resign. 
The many disappointments and disasters of the brief campaign in 
Norway resulted in the great debate on May 7 and 8, 1940. In the passion-
ate debate, Mr. Chamberlain was brought under heavy attack by both sides 
of the Commons. Mr. Lloyd George made a direct attack upon Mr. Chamberlain. 
'liThe Prime Minister," he said, "should give an example of sacrific;e, because 
there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that 
he should sacrifice the seals of office." 72 Mr. Morrison '_s speech was in 
effect a demand for the resignation of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and the Air Minister. 73 Mr. Duff Cooper, who had re-
signed from the Government, announced that he would feel compelled, however; 
reluctantly, to vote against the Government. 74 The acrimonious debate ended 
in a division. The Oppos:(:tion's motion was, technically, for the adjourn-
ment of the Commons, but Mr. Chamberlain accepted the division as equiva-
lent to a vote of confidence. The motion was carried by a majority of 
eighty-one. Thirty-one Conservative Members of Parliament voted against 
72360 H. C Db t 5 1 1 283 • ea es, s., co • , • 
73 rbid., cols. 1,251-1,253. 
74rbi'd., 1 1 300 co . ' • 
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the Government, while fifteen were ''paired" for the Government and sixty-
five were absent. Four Liberal Nationals and two National Labor members 
voted with the Opposition, together with two independent members who 
always voted for the Government. 75 
Besides the bitter attack of the Opposition, the Government's support 
had fallen so low, in comparison with the relative strength of the Party, 
that it was Chamberlain's duty to resign. The lack of confidence in his 
leadership was also seen in the large number of abstentions. These made 
it clear that he was no longer satisfactory to his party. Even Mr. 
Chamberlain himself felt that he was unable to retain his office. He told 
Mr. Churchill and Lord Halifax that it was beyond his power to form a 
Coalition Government. 76 After,'.;,he had tendered his resignation to the 
Sovereign on May 10, 1940, he spoke to his count~ymen that essential unity 
ld b d 1 d P . M" . 77 cou e secure on y un er a new rime 1n1ster. 
The Suez Incident 
Except for the Khaki Election in 1900 (when the Conservative Party 
under the leadership of Lord Salisbury succeeded in increasing its majority 
in the Connnons from 130 to 134), the 1955 parliamentary election was the 
first time in ninety years that a Government had gone to the country and 
increased its majority. There was widespread opinion that Mr. Eden would 
have been firmly in power for the next five years. 78 His conduct in the 
~The Times Weekly (London), May 15, 1940, p. 15. 
76winston S, Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 661 ff. 
77The Times Weekly (London), May 15, 1940, p. 5. 
78Randolph S. Churchill, The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, p. 200, 
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Suez Incident (1956) brought him down on January 9, 1957. 
On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces crossed the Egyptian frontier. 
Next day Mr. Eden announced the Anglo-French ultimatum in the Commons. 
With the weight of Opposition feeling behind him, Mr. Gaitskell, the 
Leader of the Opposition, pressed the Prime Minister twice to promise 
that no further physical action would be taken until the Security Council 
reached a decision or the Commons had had an opportunity to discuss the 
matter, but the Prime Minister, with unmistakable regret, told him he could 
not give such an assurance. The Government met the Opposition challenge in 
h 1 bb 79 . h . . f f.f 80 t e o y wit a maJority o i ty-two. In the debate of October 31, 
the speaker suspended the sitting for a short period because the Commons 
became extremely disorderly. Jeering and piercing shouts of "RESIGN" 
assailed Mr. Eden from the Labor benches several times. Mr. Gaitskell used 
the word "aggression" after he had repeatedly demanded of the Prime Minis-
ter to tell the Commons and the country and the whole world whether a final 
decision had been taken that British and French troops should invade the 
canal zone of Egypt. Opposition voices bombarded the Prime Minister for 
an answer. Mr. Eden finally protested that he had made it perfectly plain 
that if the British and French Governments did not receive an answer to 
their communication they would take military action at the expiration of 
the 12-hour period. He sharply refused to give the Commons any account of 
what that action and the Government's plans with their allies might be, 
But he added: "We stand by what we said and we shall carry it out." Mr. 
Gaitskell was convinced that the Government had embarked on an unrighteous 
79rhe term "in the lobby" refers to a formal vote by division, 
80558 H. C, Debates, 5 s., cols, 1,275, :l,283-1,284, 1,378. 
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adventure which would not even be justified by success. He went on to 
urge that the Opposition would use every "constitutional means" to oppose 
the "reckless and fomlish decision" of the Government, and to save the 
country from the disasters which could follow from it. 81 
In the debate of November 1, Mr. James Griffiths, the Deputy Leader 
of the Opposition, moved the motion of censure in a speech. "Get out, 
and make way for others" were his concluding words. While comparing the 
language of the Anglo-French ultimatum with that of the Germans to Belgium 
in 1914 and that of Hitler to his intended victims, Mr. Bevan exclaimed, 
'! • •• for God's sake, get out!" Mr. William Yates, a Conservative Member of 
Parliament, indicated his belief that the Government had been involved in 
an international conspiracy. Mr. Griffiths' motion was defeated by a 
G . . f" • • 82 overnment maJor1.ty o s1.xty-n1.ne. After British and French paratroops 
had been dropped on Port Said, Mr. Eden told the Commons that he had just 
received a "flash signal" stating that the Egyptian Governor and Military 
Commander at Port Said were then discussing surrender terms with the 
British. Mr. Denis Healey, a Labor Member of Parliament, icily asked whether 
83 the Prime Ministertehad exchanged congratulations with Mr. Khrushchev. 
Next day Mr. Eden announced that Anglo-French troops would cease fire at 
midnight. When after the cease fire the Opposition made its major effort 
to defeat the Government, the Commons also divided, leaving the Government 
f f "f . h 84 a majority o 1..ty-e1.g t. The result of the division was greeted with 
Opposition cries of "RESIGN." 
81Ibid., cols., 1,452-1,454, 1,461-1,462. 
82 Ibid., cols., 1,631-1,639, 1,715, 1,716, 1J750. 
83560 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 1,968. 
84 
Ibid., cols. 323-324, 404. 
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On November 23, Mr. Eden left London for a rest in Jamaica, Mr. 
Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, announced the intention of the 
Govennment to proceed with the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt 
without delay. Mr. Healey proposed that the Prime Minister should be 
recommended for the Nobel Prize because he had demonstrated that 
"aggression does not pay." Mr. Griffiths, on the other hand, commanded 
the Government to resign on the ground that the Conservative Party was 
split from top to bottom. 85 A few days later, the Government tabled a 
motion of confidence on its policy to which the Opposition tabled an 
amendment of no confidence. The issue was debated in the Commons on 
December 5 and 6 with the result that the Government obtained a majority 
of s:ix:ty-seven. 86 On the debate, Captain Charles Waterhouse, the leader·.· 
of the Suez Tories, announced openly that he would abstain from voting. 
Mr. Angus Maude, a Conservative Member of Parliament, said that he could 
not give an unconditional vote of confidence to the Government. Mr. 
Philip Noel-Baker, a Labor Member of Parliament, described the Government's 
hands as being red with Egyptian blood. 87 
Since Mr. Chamberlain fell over the Norwegian fiasco in May 1940, no 
. Tory Government had been so fatally shaken as Mr. Eden's Government. 
Apart from a series of acrimonious debates, records of the four se:ts,.; of 
parliamentary divisions clearly indicated that the time had come when Mr. 
Eden ought to give place to a new Party Leader. Moreover, Mr. Eden's 
ministerial colleagues were far from united behind his ill-advised decision. 
85 561 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 891, 894. 
86 rbid., cols. 1,254, 1,268, 1,578. 
87rbid., cols. 1,301,'1,356, 1,465. 
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In the early period of the Suez Incident, Mr. Lain Macleod and three or 
four non-cabinet Ministers seriously considered resigning. Mr. Nutting 
and Sir Edward Boyle did resign on October 31 and November 5 respectively. 
According to Mr. Eden's memmirs, .he resigned from the Prime Ministership 
because of his health. 88 Some may doubt whether he could have handled 
the incident even if he had been in good health. In addition, it is 
exceedingly doubtful whether his)party could have won the 1959 parlia-
mentary election if he had remained in office. 
The Profumo Affair 
Mr. Macmillan became Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative 
Party after the Suez Incident (1956) had appeared to doom his party to 
defeat at the polls. Instead, he led his party to greater victories in 
the 1959 parliamentary election; presided over a period of vigorous 
prosperity; and gained a reputation for skill in foreign relations. 
The Profumo scandal is one of the major scandals in modern British 
politics. Mr. John Profumo, Secretary of State for War, resigned from his 
post on June 5, after having admitted, in his letter to Mr. Macmillan 
89 
(June 4), that he had lied to the Commons on March 22 when he, with Mr. 
Macmillan at his side, said that there had been "no impropriety whatso-
ever" in his relations with Miss Christine Keeler, a 21-year-old party 
girl and self-styled model. Miss Keeler was at the same time the mistress 
of Captain Ivanov, Naval Attache at the Soviet Embassy in London. Dr. 
Stephen Ward, a society osteopath, introduced Miss Keeler to Mr. Profumo 
and Captain Ivanov. So far as the political issue is concerned, Mr. 
88Anthony Eden, pp. 650-653. 
89 The Times (London), June 6, 1963, p. 12. 
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Profumo, Miss Keeler, Dr .. Ward and even Captain Ivanov seem to belong 
to the prologue of the drama. The most important aspect of the scandal 
concerned the political future of Mr. Macmillan and his party. 
Great Britain was put in an uproar by the revelations, which 
brought Prime Minister Mac_millan under unprecedented attack from the 
Opposition, and brought his leadership under challenge from his own 
party. Six and one-half hours of dramatic debate of the Profumo scandal 
on March 17 in the Connnons 90 illustrates, in part, this point. Having 
accused Mr. Macmillan of gambling with the national security, Mr. Wilson, 
speaking as the Leader of the Opposition, went on to table, so to speak, 
the heavy question as to whether anything had been held back. Mr. Brown, 
the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, charged Mr. Macmillan that he seemed 
to be saying that "if he could show that he did not know what had happened 
or how, he was someh~w absolved." Mr. Jo Grimond, the Leader of the 
Liberal Party, was convinced that the question which faced the Connnons 
and country was whether Mr. Macmillan's Government was competent to rule 
the country. Mr, Nigel Birch, who had resigned from'.:the Macmillan Govern-
ment in 1958 in protest against the extent of public spending, proclaimed 
that it was time for Mr. Macmillan to make room for a much younger man •. 
He loyally quoted Bro_wning' s poem on "The Lost Leader" by way of friendly 
polit~cal obituary: 
Let him never come batk to us! 
There would be doubt, hesitation and pain, 
Forced praise on our party-- the glimmer of twilight, 
Never glad confident morning again! 
Sir d'Avigdor Goldsmid, a Conservative Member of Parliament, explained why 
he found himself unable to vote for the Government. What troubled him was 
90 b'd 18 1963 6 7 I 1. • , June , , PP , - • 
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the interview with the Ministers before the Profumo statement. No proper 
steps, he thought, had been taken to test the story. 
The whip, issued on June 12 to each Conservative Member of Parlia-
ment, ended with these words: "The division at the end of the Debate 
will be a Vote of Confidence and your attendance •.• is essentiai. 91 The 
sentence was underlined with three bold lines. The three-line whip indi-
cated that .absence or a failure to vote would be regarded as a serious 
sign of disloyalty. Even resorting to such as extraordinary means of 
holding party unity, the Government had a numerical majority of sixty-
nine out of a possible maximum of ninety-seven, The voting was on the 
same type of technical motion for adjournment debate which had brought 
down Mr. Chamberlain. The Government estimated that twenty-seven Con-
servative members had abstained from voting. When the vote was announced 
there were shouts of "RESIGN" from the Opposition benches. More signifi-
cant is the fact that those who had voted for the Government were by no 
means solidly in favor of Mr. Macmillan's continued leadership. One Con-
servative member said afterwards: "Yes, I voted, but I want a new Prime 
Minister. 11 92 Another Conservative member said with brutal joviality: 
"Why waste a torpedo ••• on a ship that's already sunk? 1193 Sir Frank Markham, 
a Conservative backbencher, stated: "As far as I am concerned, I am quite 
certain the Prime Minister must go." He went on to say tha.t his vote 
"must not be taken as approval of the present leadership, 11 94 
91New York Times, June 18, 1963, p. 13. 
92Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 120, 1963, p. 2. 
93New Statesman, June 21, 1963, p. 922, 
94 New York Times, June 19, 1963, p. 1. 
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Mr. Macmillan's Government survived four debates in which the 
Government majority was lower than sixty-nine. In January 1963, two 
votes on the Government's plan to reorganize the London County Council 
0 
resulted in a majority of twenty-eight on the first vote and of twenty-
. h d 95 six on t e secon vote. In April 1963, a Bill, already mentioned 
before, was passed by a majority of sixty on its second reading. Again 
in April 1963, an Opposition motion condemning the Government's handling 
of the case of Chief Encharo was defeated by a Government majority of 
96 
fifty-six. However, Mr. Macmillan's competence and judgments had never 
been under such heavy attack from both sides of the Commons as in the case 
of his conduct of the Profumo Affair. Besides the fierceness of the 
dramatic debate, the number of abstentions could be regarded as a clear 
signal of the decline of his leadership. 
Furthermore, the Profumo scandal was only the latest of a series of 
reverses which included mounting unemployment, sluggishness in the economy, 
failure to lead Great Britain into the European Common Market, the 
collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the American cancel-
lation of the Skybolt ~~e program, and the breach of security in the 
Vassal Spy Case. Worst of all was that in his conduct of the Profumo 
Affair, his ministerial colleagues h~d lined up behind Mr. Macmillan only 
after some hesitations. Mr. Enoch Powell, Minister of Health, not only 
criticized Mr. Macmillan's handling of the affair, but also the Ministers 
who questioned Mr. Profumo on the midnight of March 21, and accepted his 
95New York Times, June 18, 1963, p. 1. 
96 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 18, 1963, p. 4. 
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explanation of his relations with Miss Keeler. It was reported that Mr . 
Powell would resign and that Sir Keith Josopy, Minister of Housing and 
Local Government, and Sir Edward Boyle, Minister of Education, would 
associate with Mr. Powell and resign.98 
The decay of Mr. Macmillan's leadership was further indicated by the 
fact that one week after the dramatic debate, there were two attempts made 
by the Conservative backbenchers to force Mr. Macmillan to resign. The 
attempts were skillfully thwarted by party leaders.99 General sentiment 
within his party was well expressed by the two strongly Conservative 
newspapers.lOO The Daily Telegraph commented: "To be innocent of negli-
gence is at least a negative virtue in a Prime Minister. It is by more 
stringent standards that Mr. Macmillan's position as leader will be judged." 
The Daily Mail remarked that "the more the search-light probes into securi-
ty, the worse the mess revealed." 
Here was a Prime Minister who had been subject to bitter reproaches 
and fierce denunciations by both sides of the Commons. Here also was a 
Party Leader who had failed in maintaining party unity and solidarity. It 
97New York Times, June 14, 1963, p. 4 . It is known that on March 21 , 
the night when Mr. George Wigg , a Labor Member of Parliament, openly 
challenged the Government to answer the rumors circulating, Mr. Profumo 
was confronted by a group of his ministerial colleagues. Mr. Mac leod, the 
~eader of the House of Commons, and Mr. Redmayne, the Government Chief 
Whip, were the principal interrogators, but Attorney General, Sir John 
Hobson, was also present and at least one other Minister too. They 
accepted Mr. Profumo's word and helpe d him draft the personal statement he 
made to the Commons a few hours l a ter, with Mr . Macmillan at his side. 
See : Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 13, 1963, p. 3. 
98New York Times, June 14, 1963, p. 1. 
99 Ibid . , June 29, 1963, p. 4. 
100 k . New Yor Times, June 19, 1963, p. 6. 
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is evident that what Prime Minister Macmillan now had on his hands was 
not just a regrettable scandal but rather an all-pervading crisis of 
political confidence. The electorate would not be . easily persuaded that 
the Conservative Party under Macmillan's leadership any longer had the 
capacity to govern the country. On July 4, 1963, the Conservative Party 
suffered sharp set-backs in two by-elections. The two Labor winners, 
Mr. John E. Silkin and Mr. Maurice Foley, won by increased majorities. 
This, of course, can be properly treated as the re-evaluation of the Con-
servative image by the electorate. As Mr. John Brimacombe, one of the two 
defeated Conservative candidates, put it: ''Bearing the current difficulties 
within the Conservative Party, the result is not surprising. 11101 
The Conservative Party was confronted by two problems; namely, who 
would succeed Mr. Macmillan and what would happen in the nex t parlia-
mentary election which must be held by October 1964? Mr. Macmillan told 
the Conservative backbenchers that "all being well, if I keep health and 
strength, I hope to l e ad the party into the election." He reaffirmed his 
102 intention on June 28. Nevertheless, his capacity to command his party 
and the possibility of his party winning the next parliamentary election 
were undoubtedly in question. 103 
101Ibid. , July 5, 1963, pp. 1, 3. 
102 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 18, 1963, p. 4; and The Times 
(London), June 29, 1963, p. 8. 
103The question of Mr. Macmillan's suitability for the office of Prime 
Minister was resolved in October 1963 by his own decision to r e tire 
following a surgical operation. It was evident that reasons other than 
declining health were present, and that the latter provided a convenient 
face -saving occasion for the Prime Minister to resign the leade rship of 
the Government, the House of Commons, and the Conse rvative Party. His 
designation of Lord Home to the Sovereign as his successor raised a 
storm of criticism within the Conservative Party and in Parliament, but 
the division in the ranks of the Gonservative leadership again left the 
s e l ect ion of the Party Leader to the Monarch. 
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The Lansbury Case 
In view of the capital importance for the Party Leader to retain 
the goodwill and mutual understanding of the majority of his party, as 
indicated by the above three cases, this appears to be the proper place 
to cite the Lansbury Case. The Party Leader only goes where he believes 
the majority of his followers will go after him. He must always choose 
his direction correctly. As long as he desires to remain in the driver's 
seat, he must show constant concern in which that car is travelling. 
With the expansion of Japan in the Far East and the rise of Nazism 
and Fascism in Europe, Mr. George Lansbury, the Leader of the Labor 
Party (1931-1935), tried to impose his personal convictions at the expense 
of the mood of his party. Mr. Lansbury, a life-long pacifist, was firmly 
convinced that "those who take the sword shall perish by the sword, 11 104 
He was not merely opposed to the use of armaments for self-defense but 
concerned over the very existence of the League of Nations. The union 
leaders, who then exercised a dominant voice in the Labor Party, regarded 
the rise of militarism, Nazism, and Fascism not only as a challenge to 
democratic values but as murderous assault against the international work-
ing class movement, To the union leaders, collective security through the 
League of Nations was the most effective means to stop aggression, 
At the 1935 Annual Conference of the Labor Party, Mr. Lansbury stood 
against a resolution reaffirming the policy which was laid down by the 
National Executive Committee, The resolution wholly committed the Labor 
Party to support a League policy of sanctions, The resolution called upon 
the Government "in co-operation with other nations represented at the 
104Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin (London: Hutchinson, 1952), p. 192. 
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Council and Assembly of the Leasue to use all necessary measures (i.e., 
economic sanctions in the first place, but if necessary, military 
sanctions too) provided by the Covenant to prevent Italy's unjust and 
105 
rapacious attack upon the territory of a fellow-member of the League." 
The general sentiment of the Party was put at the opening of the 
address of the Chairman of the Conference (i.e., Mr. W. A. Robinson). 
He justified support of League action as the logical fulfilment of Labor 
policy. He said: 
We stand for strong collective action in defence of peace 
against any aggressor. This policy was reaffirmed last year 
by a smashing majority at our Southport Conference •••• The 
immediate question for us to decide is: "Do we stand firm in 
this crisis for the policy to which we have so often pledged 
ourselves, or shall we turn tail and run away, repudiate our 
obligations under the Covenant of the League and signal "All 
clear"? l06 
To Mr. Lansbury, any policy which looked to the employment of force to 
attain its ends was absolutely inconsistent with Christian pacifism. He 
insisted that the policy, "a big fundamental piece of policy," for which 
his party stood was "a terrible mistake. 11107 He realized fully that if the 
resolution was passed he had to resign. This he said he would do. In his 
closing words, he stated: 
It may be that I shall not meet you on this platform any more •••• 
If mine was the only voice in this Conference, I would say in 
the name of faith I hold, the belief I have that God intended 
us to live peaceably and quietly with one another, that if some 
people do not allow us to do so, I am ready to stand as the early 
Christians did, and say: "This is our faith, this is where we 
stand, and, if necessary, this where we will die. 11 108 
105Francis Williams, Fifty Years' March (London: Odhams, 1949), p. 352. 
106Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs (1931-1945) (London: 
Frederick, 1957), p--;-7;7. ·· 
107 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 4, 1935, p. 266. 
108see 102. 
Mr. Bevin accused him directly of "trailing your conscience round from 
body to body asking to be told what to do with it."l09 When Mr. Bevin 
was told by his friends that it was unnecessary to bring an old comrade 
under such a violent personal attack, he replied: 
Lansbury has been going about dressed in Saint's clothes for 
years waiting for martyrdom. I set fire to the faggots,110 
Although the delegates were moved emotionally by Mr. Lansbury's 
38 
speech, his absolute pacifism did not alter the view of the vast majority 
of the delegates. Sympathy with him did not preclude s~pathy with a 
party which was facing both a national crisis and a parliamentary election. 
There was a remarkably strong sentiment in the counntry in favor of. 
/.,-,/ 
sanctions by the League of Nations, if necessary involving the use of 
force. No responsible party leader could any longer avoid the question 
whether he was prepared for the country to go to war in order to stop 
aggression. The resolution was carried by an overwhelming majority 
(2,168,000 votes to 102,000), and Mr. Lansbury thereupon resigned the 
leadership of the Labor Party. 
In comparison with Mr. Lansbury's irrational stubbornness, Mr. Gait~kell, 
the leader of the Labor Party (December 1955-January 1963), was a more 
"humane" leader. He did conform to the general feeling of his party at the 
expense of his personal belief. For instance, in the early period of the 
Suez Crisis he compared President Nasser with Hitler and Mussolini, and 
said that the use of force could be justified in certain events. However, 
once·the Parliamentary Labor Party committed itself against the Eden 
l09Ibid., p. 193. 
llOibid., p. 196. 
Government's Suez policy, he kept fighting with all he had. He pledged 
the Labor Party to oppose, by every constitutional means, the Eden 
Government's Suez policy towards Egypt. 111 Broadcasting on television 
and radio, he said that "Parliament must repudiate the Government, The 
P . M" . . rr,112 rime inister must resign. Calling for the withdrawal of British 
troops from Egypt, he criticized "the appalling arrogance of the Tory 
Government in the present circumstances. 11 113 In 1959, he further 
admonished the Government that the Suez affair "is now generally ad-
39 
mitted to have been a disastrous act of folly almost without parallel in 
our country. 11 114 
SUMMARY 
The difference in the leadership roles between the Conservative and 
Labor Party leaders is more theoretical than real, particularly in 
situations when the Leader holds the office of Prime Minister. When the 
British party leader holds the office of Prime Minister, he is, in fact, 
the single instrument of legitimate authority over the parliamentary party. 
The combination of disciplinary powers and other sanctions which may be 
exercised by the Prime Minister in relation to the membership of his party 
in the CoII)IIlons makes him, without doubt, a political leader of unparalleled 
authority in the contemporary democratic world. 
The Prime Minister's powers are far from autocratic however. The 
British system of leadership is conditioned by a number of conventions 
lll553 H. C. Db t 5 1 1 461 ea es, s., co. , . 
ll2Th T" e imes (London), November 5, 1956, p. 4. 
113rbid., November 26, 1956, p. 5. 
114602 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 43, 
40 
which impose a heavy burden of responsibility upon the Prime Minister, 
He is accountable first to his party for the public image cast by his 
leadership. His effectiveness as a leader will be judged within the 
party by his ability to win public consensus. Exposed as he must be to 
the constant attacks and criticisms levelled by the Opposition, he must 
h~ld the public's confidence in the face of relentless pressures, It is 
his responsibility to protect his party's parliamentary majority, and 
this can be done only by answering his critics with effective arguments 
that will convince the public of his wisdom and competence. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROLE AS LEADER OF 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
Prerogatives and Powers of the Leader of the House 
It is a matter of corrnnon knowledge that the major function of 
Parliament is legislation. "The principle of parliamentary sovereignty," 
said Professor A. V. Dicey, "means ••• that Parliament has, under the 
English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and 
further no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having 
a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament, 111 Con-
sidering the priority of the Government's business and the voting pattern 
in the Commons, we are going to inquire how much this classic statement 
on the absolute legislative authority of Parliament remains true, In 
addition, some prerogatives of the leader of the House of Corrnnons will be 
briefly surveyed. 
Initiation of Legislative Proposals 
The Prime Minister and his colleagues are by no means simply the 
executive agents who implement legislation enacted by Parliament; they have 
the dominating authority over legislation. Usually, Government business 
1A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 9th ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1939), pp. 39-40. 
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occupies nine-tenths of the time of the House of Commons,2 
Assuming that a Private member is given a chance to introduce a Bill, 
and should the Government fail to kill the Bill at second reading, which 
is the major hurdle, it can amend or obstruct the Bill at the latter 
stages. For instance, the National Insurance Benefits Bill was amended 
at the committee stage to incorporate the recommendations of the National 
3 Insurance Advisory Committee which the Government had decided to accept. 
The Industrial Rating Bill obtained a second reading after a vote in which 
the Opposition had a majority of twnety-one, but the Government successful- .,,--
ly killed the Bill at the third reading by a vote of 179 to 134. 4 
In some cases, a Private member who is unusually popular will be able 
to steer an important Bill through the Commons. Mr. Sidney Silverman's 
Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill of 1956 was the most famous example. 5 It is 
worthy to add that a Standing Order prohibits the introduction of any 
2During 1928-1929, 1931-1932, 1934-1935, 1946-1948, and the years of 
the two world wars, the Government took all the time of the House of 
Commons, See: W, J. Jennings, Parliament, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1957), p. 115. Professor Sidney Low remarked: "Every 
member of the House, with exception of a score or so, who sit on the front 
benches to the right of the Speaker ' s chair, would admit, if he spoke the 
truth, that his influence over legislation was little greater than that of 
a private individual outside, He has the opportunity to criticise, to 
object, to make suggestions; but so has any writer in the press, or anyone 
else who is able to address his countrymen in writing or by word of mouth." 
See: Sidney Low, The Governance of England, 2nd ed. (London: T. Fisher 
Union, 1910), p. 60, 
3552. H. C. Debates, 5 s • ' cols, 845-850, 1,573, 
4550 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' col. 782; and 551 H. c. Debates, 5 s • ' col. 
2,224. 
~r. Bulter once referred to Mr. Sidney Silverman as a justum et 
tenacem propositi virum. See: 564 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col, 455, There 
have been other examples--Sir Alan Herbert's Marriage Bill of 1937, and 
Mr. Ellen Wikinson's Hire Purchase Bill of 1938, 
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proposal to spend public money except on the recommendation of the Crown, 
i.e., the Government. This is a very effective weapon to curb the 
activities of pressure groups. 
Nevertheless, the Government should take parliamentary opinion into 
account. Accordingly, it, upon occasion, must make concessions graciously. 
In the case of the Judges' Remuneration Bill, for instance, so much 
opposition was aroused by both sides of the Commons that the Government 
thought it wiser to withdraw the Bill than to force 
6 
it through. Although 
the Prime Minister and his colleagues have the primary prerogative to 
develop the legislative program and to sponsor Public Bills, the Opposition 
is always consulted on the order of business, However, we should always 
keep in mind that the last word as well as the first belongs to the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues exclusively. 
Direction of the Parliamentary Majority 
With the political parties in Great Britain organized as they are, 
independence in voting is not lightly undertaken; and it, as many concrete 
cases cited in the first chapter indicate, may lead to serious political 
consequences for the dis sentient Member of Parliament (i.e., his political 
career may be prematurely ended). Six years after Mr. Churchill became a 
Member of Parliament, he complained: "The earnest party man becomes a 
silent drudge, tramping at intervals throughl]iobbies to record his vote and 
7 wondering why he came to Westminster at all." Forty-three years later, he 
6This happened, also, in the,.,case of the Coal Mines Bill of 1936, 
which was withdrawn in the face of the bitter criticism of both sides of 
the Commons at second reading of the Bill. 
7winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (New York and London: 
Macmillan, 1906), Vol. I, p. 69. 
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could remark: "Loyalty to the chosen Leader of the party is the prime 
characteristic of the Conservative. 118 The main task of a Member of Parlia-
ment is to come to Westminster to be a good party man. 
Of course, a member of the House of Commons is subject to many kinds 
of pressures from inside and outside the Commons. For instance; pressure 
from his colleagues, his Whips, his Ministers, or Shadow Cabinet, his party-
committees; and his constituents, his party headquarters, his trade union or 
business associates, his personal friends, and national organization. How-
9 ever, he normally votes as he is required to vote by his party leaders. 
Lord Pakenham once said that "the Tories treated their leader as if he were 
the Admiralty; Labour sometimes went to the other extreme and treated theirs 
as if he were Lucifer. 1110 Whatever his attitude towards his Party Leader 
may be, every Member of Parliament is quite aware that loyalty to the Party 
Leader must take precedence ove:ir- any conflicting loyalty. 
It is not necessary for a Member of Parliament to attend every parlia-
mentary session. He can make up his own mind about whether to participat~ 
8winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
·1949), p. 9. 
9 
Mr. W. s. Gilbert, in his Iolanthe, remarked about the situation in 
this fashion: 
When in that House M.P. 's divide, 
If they've brain and cerebellum, too, 
They've got to leave the brain outside, 
And vote just as their leaders tell 'em to. 
But then the prospect of a lot 
Of dull M.P.'s in close proximity, 
All thinking for themselves, is what 
No man can face with equanimity~ 
See:_ W. s. Gilbert, Plays & Poems of W. S. Gilbert (New York: Random House, 
1932), p. 267. 
10naily Telegraph, November 30, 1959, quoted in Roland Young, The British 
Parliament (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 73. 
actively in certain debates. In March 1963, for instance, there was a 
scandal in the Connnons when it was debating the cost of the RAF in the 
coming year--530,000,000 pounds. The highest number of Ministers and 
Conservative backbenchers present during the debate was thirty-three. 11 
45 
But on important issues he is expected to attend the debate and vote for his 
party. This is a minimum obligation which he is expected to fulfill. On 
~ one occasion, a Member of Parliament who was taking a bath in Westminster 
12 Palace arrived in the lobby swathed in a large towel. 
A Member of Parliament does not come to Westminster to turn the House 
of Connnons into a congress of conflicting local and sectional claims. "Log-
rolling," and "distributing the pork barrel" are unknown to Members of 
Parliament. Of course, a Member of Parliament is responsible for bringing 
the grievances of his constituency to the attention of the Connnons and 
looking for opportunities to help his constituents. But his main task is to 
vote for his party, i.e., to be a good party man. For example, when the 
Connnons was debating the problem of unemployment, Mrs,. Patricia McLaughlin, 
a Conservative Member of Parliament, held up before Connnons a red glove 
which she described as "the red hand of Ulster." Throwing down the glove 
as a challenge to Mr. Macmillan's Government, she said that the problem of 
unemployment in Ulster must be solved. She went on to ask: "Can you, will 
you solve our unemployment problem?" Mr. S~:Ldney Silverman, a Labor Member 
of Parliament, jeered at her: "If the honorable lady means what she said 
in her speech, then her duty to herself and to her constituents is to come 




Taylor, The House of Connnons at Work, 3rd ed. (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1958), p. 119. 
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into the lobby with us at the end of the day and back her opinion with her 
vote."13 But Mrs. McLaughlin did not go to the wrong lobby! 
Sometimes, a free-vote is permitted if the Government's prestige and 
general policies are not detriment~lly affected by the result of a vote. 
For instance, in a vote on a Private Member's Bill concerning the publica-
tion of wills, the vote was thirty to twenty-six, the explanation of which 
is that on the debate of the Bill the Solicitor General explained Mr. 
14 
Macmillan's Government position as "one of complet~ neutrality." During 
1952-1957, according to Mr. Nigel Nicolson, a Conservative Member of Parlia-
ment who was forced to resign his parliamentary seat in 1957, the total 
number of free votes was as follows: 1952, thirteen; 1953, thirteen; 1954, 
eight; 1955, nine; 1956, thirty-one (many of them connected with the Death 
· 15 - Penalty Abolition Bill); and 1957, fourteen. When the Connnons voted on a 
resolution calling for a Royal Commission to investigate the press, and when 
a free vote was permitted by the Government, Mr. W. J. Brown, a Labor Member 
of Parliament, commented: 
This is a very remarkable day. It is the first day since July of 
last year, and indeed, for a good many years before then, that 
the freely elected representatives of free constituencies of free 
Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen, are to be left free by the 
government of the day, to vote as they think fit on an important 
issue coming before this House. Yesterday we were not free; today 
we are free. Tomorrow freedom will have departed again. And as 
it departs, I imagine that we shall hear its spirit pathetically 
complaining: "If I was so soon to be done for, I wonder what I· 
was begun for? 1116 · 
13597 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1,241-1,242. 
14596 H~ C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 695, 790. 
15Nigel Nicolson, People and Parliament (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1958), p. 71. 
16428 H C Db 5 1 530 ••. e ates, s., co • • 
47 
Subsidiary Prerogatives 
Besides his prerogative to fix and supervise, through his colleagues, 
all principal matters of parliamentary business, the Prime Minister on 
several occasions, actually acts as the head of the House of Commons 
because he cannot, even formally, delegate some prerogatives effectively. 
At the openion of each session of Parliament, the Speech from the 
Throne is read by the Sovereign in person to the House of Lords. If she 
cannot attend, it ts read by the Lord Chancellor or another member of the 
Commission of Peers. The Prime M.inister leads the Commons to listen to 
the Queen's Speech to the upper House. The Speech expresses the general 
policies of the Government and the Government's legislative program for 
the parliamentary session. Revision of the wording is sometimes suggested 
by the Sovereign, but the last word belongs to the Prime Minister 
exclusively. Sympathetic references are also made by the Prime Minister on 
the death of a distinguished statesman, even if he is a member of the 
Opposition party. For instance, in a tribute to Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, the 
late leader of the Opposition, in the Commons on January 22, 1963, Mr. 
Macmillan said: 
Swift and spectacular in his rise, courteous yet unflinching 
in his principles, an attractive companion, a parliamentary 
ranking with the great figures of the past, a man fully 
worthy and capable of being Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, Mr. Macmillan moved the adjournment of· the House of Commons. 
d . 11 h ' d 1 h d h f f · · · 17 Tra itiona y, tis is one on yon t e eat o a armer Prime Minister. 
It is the Prime Minister's prerogative and duty to make statements on 
the general policies of the Government in the Commons. Mr. William Rose once 
stated in the Commons: "We want the Prime Minister, not the office boy. 1117 -a 
17Manchester Guardian Weekly, January 24, 1963, p. 3. 
17-a594 H. c. Debates, 5 s., col. 973. 
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In July 1961, for example, Mr. Macmillan issued a statement in which he 
declared: . 11 I wish to make a statement on the policy of Her Majesty's 
Government towards the European Economic Cornmunity ••• 1118 In addition, the 
Prime Minister also speaks when some event of national importance occurs, 
such as a declaration of war, the conclusion of peace, or an important 
treaty. When, on September 3, 1939, Great Britain declared war against 
Germany, it was Mr. Chamberlain, acting in the name of the Crown, who made 
the declaration in the Connnons. 19 On May fl:, 1945, the Instrument of General 
Capitulation was signed at Rheims. Next day Mr. Churchill stated in the 
20 
Counnons that the German war was at an end. In July 1963, Mr. Macmillan 
announced the success of the negotiations in Moscow for the "historic a-
21 greement, 11 partly banning tests of nuclear weapons, to the Connnons. 
After consulting with the Cabinet and assuring himself that the choice 
is acceptable to the House of Connnons, the Prime Minister selects the 
Sp~aker of the House. He also appoints the Government Chief Whip to 
direct the party forces of the majority. The Chief Whip, with the approval 
of the Prime Minister, selects thirteen assistants who are cynically called 
the whip's narks, or stool pigeons. 22 The Chief Whip is usually known as 
the Patronage Secretary, although patronage is not what it once was in the 
days of Sir Robert Walpole (Prime Minister, 1721-1742) or what is still in 
the United States. Five of his assistants are Lord Connnissioners of the 
18645 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' col. 928. 
19351 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' cols. 291-292. 
20410 H. c. Debates, 5 cols; 1,867-1,869. ------s. ' 
21The Times (London), July 26, 1963, p. 6. -----
22New York Times, June 18, 1963, p. 13. 
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Treasury and three more hold positions in the Royal Household, as Treasurer, 
Controller, and Vice-Chamberlain, Other Government assistant Whips hold no 
bffice and receive no payment. All the Opposition Whips are unpaid, The 
Whips are the principal channel through which the Party Leader learns of 
the currents of opinion of the rank-and-file in the Commons. The relevant 
material will be passed to the Prime Minister by the Government Chief Whip, 
and to the Leader of the Opposition by the Opposition Chief Whip. More-
over, parliamentary business is arranged by consultation between the Leader 
of the House of Commons, 23 who acts under the direction of the Prime 
Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition, using the Whips (i.e., "the 
usual channels") as their intermediaries. The debate on the Profumo scandal 
on June 17, 1963 was an example of such cooperation, The reasoned amend-
ment to the Speech from the Throne, motions of no confidence, and formal 
23 In the days when it was practically possible for a Prime Minister to 
sit in the upper House, he us ed to appoint one of his more trus t ed 
colleagues to l ead the lower House. Since February 1942 , he has appointed 
one of his senior colleagues to act as the Leader of the House of Commons , 
"This development," Lord Morrison, former Leader of the House of Commons 
(1945-1951), remarked, "reflects the growth of party discipline , and, 
mainly, the very heavy pressure on the Prime Minister ' s duty." See: 
Herbert Morrison, Government and _Parliament, 2nd ed. (London, New York, 
and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 117. Eighteen of forty-
three Prime Ministe rs have sat in the upper House. The l ast one before 
the recent appointment of Lord Home in 1963 was Lord Salisbury in 1895. 
See: John Merrett, How Parliament Works (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1960), p. 45. There has been one unique case. In the 1906 par lia-
mentary election, which brought one of the heavi es t defeat s in its 
history to the Conservative Party, the Leader of the Party (and the Prime 
Minister), Arthur J. Balfour, was defeat ed at the polls, When the new 
Parliament met in February 1907, he asked Mr . Joseph Chamberlain to lead 
the Opposition during his absence. In March 1907, he returned t o the 
House of Commons aft er winning a by-election in the city of London. It 
must be added tha t Mr. Balfour's leadership was disliked by many of his 
fo llowers and the Party was divided between tariff-reformers and free-
traders, See: Edward T. Winte rton, Orde rs of the Q~ (London: Cass e l l, 
1953), pp. 14-17, 316 . 
motions for or against a particular Government policy are arranged 
through the usual channels. 
Responsibilities of the Leader 
of 
the House 
In the field of legisiation, parliamentary supremacy, in fact, has 
lost its meaning. Again, it ·is theoretically true that the Government 
can be ousted by the House of Connnons through passage of a motion of 
censure or for want of confidence; or for passage of Bills to which the 
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Government is expressedly opposed; or for rejecting important Government 
measures. As a matter of fact, since 1896 there has been only one 
Government (1924) which was defeated in the Connnons. On January 21, 1924, 
Mr. Baldwin's Government was defeated by a vote of 256 to 328 on the 
Debate on the Address from the Tb.rone.24 We, however, must be aware that 
the Baldwin Government was short of a parliamentary majority. In 1924, the 
Commons contained_ three parties, none of which had a majority: the Con-
servative Party held 255 seats, the Labor Party 191, and the Liberal Party 
158. As long as the party holds its majority, it is the Government that 
controls the Connnons, and not the latter that controls the former. Even 
if the Government is defeated in the Commons, the Prime Minister ha,s inde-
pendent power to decide either to resign or to dissolve the Commons. The 
Government's control over the Commons has resulted in much talk of the de-
cline of Parliament and the dictatorship of the Government. The principal 
problem, of course, is whether ministerial responsibility has survived. 
24Backhofer Roberts, Stanley Baldwin: ~ £E. Miracle? (New York: 
Greenburg, 1937), p. 125; and Philip Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography 
(London: J. Nicholson and Watson, 1934), Vol. II, pp. _601-605. 
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Question Period 
It is understood that ministerial responsibility is one of the basic 
principles of the British constitution. Besides the vote of confidence, 
the vote of censure, and policy debates, the system of Question Time is 
one of the methods of enforcing ministerial responsibility, although 
theoretically no legal requirement to answer is involved, Mr. Speaker 
Clifton Brown once remarked: "A Question is not in Order if it does not 
involve ministerial responsibility. 1125 "I'll have a question asked in the 
House" is a phrase that has been employed tens of thousands of times by 
Members of Parliament. The Prime Minister and his colleagues are political-
ly accountable to provide the Commons necessary information. On several 
occasions, questions may be put to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minis-
ter, in turn, is responsible for answering certain questions. In exception-
al cases, a general debate may occur at the close of Question Time. 
Following the explanation on the original question, supplementary 
questions may be asked, without notice, by the original questioner or other 
Members of Parliament. It is not always possible to anticipate the 
supplementary question or to handle it effectively. For instance, Mr. Emrys 
Hughes, the great humorist at Question Time, once asked Prime Minister 
Macmillan "what study of prison conditions he made.during his tour of 
Africa." Mr. R. A. Butler, the Leader of the House of Commons, replying for 
Mr. Macmillan, who was visiting Africa, answered: "None, Sir." Thereupon 
Mr. Hughes asked: "Would not the Home Secretary agree that the Prime 
Minister is missing a unique opportunity for completing his political edu-
cation? Could not he arrange to be taken into protective custody, where he 
25 446 H. C, Debates, 5 s., col. 1,816. 
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might meet Dr. Banda and have the experience which a good many Prime 
Ministers who will attend the Commonwealth Conference already have had?" 
Paying tribute to Mr. Hughes' reputation at Question Time, Mr. Butilier re-
plied with a good joke: "I have already promised my right honorable 
Friend that on the resumption of Parliament the first supplementary 
question put by the honorable Member would be immediately telegraphed to 
him for his delectation and amusement, and I shall certainly do that. 1126 
In February 1960, a question was asked about the possibility of appoint-
ing a Select Committee "to consider the televising of parts of the pro-
ceedings of the.House of Commons," and also whether the Prime Minister 
would consider "arranging for experiments to be made by the taking of a 
film at Question Time, so that it can be used by the television service 
at their peak period." This led to a supplementary question by Mr. 
Hughes. He asked: "Is the Prime Minister aware that there is a growing 
custom now to televising religious services? Will he consider having 
discussions now about whether Prayers in the House of Commons should be 
televised in order to attract the Government Front Bench?" Mr. Macmillan 
humorously replied: "It might also attract today's absent questioners. 1127 
In the event of a matter of urgency a Member of Parliament may apply 
to Mr. Speaker to ask a question by "Private Notice." During the contro-
versy over the use of Government envelopes for mailing political propa-
ganda, Mr. Peart was permitted by Mr. ·speaker to put a question to Prime 
Minister Macmillan by a Private Notice. He asked Mr. Macmillan "whether 
he is now in a position to make a statement as to the allegation that a 
26 616 H. C. Debates, 5 s • , cols. 29-30. 
27 
617 H. C. Debates, 5 s.' cols. 1,421-1,422. 
53 
Conservative Central Office Press release notice was sent out in an 
official Ministry of Education envelope. 1128 
At the close of Question Time, a motion "to adjourn for the purpose 
of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance" may be 
moved by forty Members of Parliament. If the Speaker of the House 
accepts this motion, a general debate may occur. This kind of motion 
usually comes from the Opposition, but it usually fails passage because of 
party solidarity. Between 1945 and 1957, according to Mr. Chapman (a Labor 
Member of Parliament), only eight of seventy-three such requests were 
29 granted, There have been two famous precedents of the adjournment de-
bate which brought down two Prime Ministers (i.e., Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. 
Eden). 
After Mr. Churchill became ill in June 1953, the House of Commons 
accepted the arrangement that the Prime Minister would answer questions 
himself on Tuesdays and Thursdays. '.J;'his arrangement was conttlmued by Mr. 
Eden and Mr. Macmillan without the same cause. Questions may be put to the 
Prime Minister on Mondays and Wednesdays, but they are generally answered 
by the Leader of theHouse of Commons. 
The Prime Minister, as the chief spokesman of the Government in the 
Commons, answers_questions concerning the general policies of the Govern-
ment. Mr. Gernyhough once asked the Prime Minister: "Can the Prime Minis-
ter tell us whether he expects the Summit talks to take place before or 
after the General Election?" "Well, Sir," Mr. Macmillan teased him, "that 
depends upon two not absolutely known factors: first, when the General 
28595 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col, 569, 
29574 H. C, Debates, 5 s., col. 897. 
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Election will be; and, second, when the Summit talks will be. 11 30 
Questions where the Prime Minister has been publicly and personally 
involved are also answered by himself. On April 24, 1956, Mr. Khrushchev 
and Mr. Bulganin appeared in the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery at the 
House of Commons. Having expressed the hope that Prime Minister·· Eden's 
conversations with Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin might prove successful, 
Mr. Robens asked whether a White Paper would be issued "indicating the 
topics discussed and the conclusions arrived at." Mr. Eden replied that 
the conversations were confidential, but "the results would be fully ex-
31 posed in due course." Mr. Henderson once addressed a question to Prime 
Minister Macmillan whether he had received a reply from Mr. Khrushchev to 
his letter of October 28, 1962 and whether he should publish the reply. 
Having received the reply, Mr. Macmillan answered that he could not publish 
the reply because it had been given to him by private letter not transmit-
. 32 
ted over the radio. 
It is customary for the Prime Minister to answer questions about the 
general arrangements of the Government. On June 14, 1954, Prime Ministe.r 
Churchill was asked whether he would reconsider his refusal to separate 
the Ministry of Agriculture from the Ministry of Fisheries in view of the 
national importance of the fishing industry. He gave a humorous and 
characteristically brilliant reply: "It would not, I feel, be a good 
arrangement to have a separate Department for every industry of national 
importance. These two. industries have been long associated departmentally 
30602 H. c. Debates, 5 s • ' col. 1,334. 
31551 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' col. 1,618. 
32668 H. c. Debates, 5 s. ' col. 1,497. 
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and, after all, there are many ancient links between fish and chips. 11 33 
filn November 1962, Prime Minister Macmillan gave a negative answer to the 
question whether he would appoint a Minister responsible for development 
underneath the sea within British territorial waters. 34 The Prime Minis-
ter often handles questions about foreign policy and defense, the conduct 
of which is essentially placed upon his shoulders. A question addressed 
by the Leader of the Opposition is always answered by the Prime Minister 
in person, for such kind of question is an''unmistakable direct challenge 
by Her Majesty's Opposition. 
Individual as well as collective responsibility is tempered by the 
convention that any·Minister may, on a plea of national interest, refuse 
to provide information in reply to a question. One instance of this kind 
was the attitude of Prime Minister Eden to the questions about the disap-
perance of an ex-frogman, Commander Lionel Crabb, in Portmouth Harbor on 
the occasion of the visit of Russian warships carrying Mro Khrushchev and 
Mr._Bulganin in May 1956. Asserting that "it would not be in the public 
interest to disclose the circumstances in which Commander Crabb is pre-
sumed to have met his death," Mr. Eden.said that whilst it was the practice 
for the Ministers to accept responsibility, what had happened was without 
the authority or knowledge of Her Majesty's Ministers, and that certain 
35 disciplinary action was being taken. In a subsequent debate, Sir Patrick 
Spens defended Mr. Eden's attitude as follows: 
33528 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' col. 2,274. 
34668 H. c. Debates, 5 s • ' col. 203. 
35552 H. c. Debates, 5 s.' col. 1,220. 
Once the responsible Minister of the Crown, accepting full 
responsibility upon himself, has said it is impossible to 
give the public information because public security is in-
volved it behooves no other responsible citizen ••. to at-
tempt to carry the matter further in this way. It is the 
responsibility of Ministers and always has been to give 
such a considered answer when the occasion arises 0 3 
In December 1962, on the debate of the Skybolt Missle Talks, Mr. Walker 
asked whether Prime Minister Macmillan would issue a precise statement 
about the talks. Mr. Macmillan refused the request on the ground of 
37 "the interests of the country." Fortunately, it is seldom in peace-
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time that a Minister refuses to answer a question on the ground of public 
interest. 
Parliamentary Inquiries 
It is part of the task of the Opposition (as well as the Private 
Members) to extract information, which might not have been disclosed at 
Question Time, from the Government. The consent of the Government, how-
ever, is indispensable if further inquiries or investigations are under-
taken. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister is politically responsible to 
grant some form of further inquiry or investigation. The John Waters Case 
(1957), the Vassall Spy Case (1963), and the Profumo Affair (1963) will 
illustrate the above points. 
On December 7, 1957, two police constables (i.e., Mr. Gunn.and Mr. 
Harper) were reported to have struck a boy, John Waters, in Thurso, 
Scotland. The Lord Advocate stated in the Commons that Crown Counsel in 
Edinburgh, after considering the evidence, had decided that criminal pro-
ceedings against the constables concerned would not be justified. The-
36rbid., col. 1,767. 
37669 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 580-581. 
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Secretary of State for Scotland was of the same view as Crown Counsel, and 
refused to move further inquiry into the case. Some Members of Parliament, 
both Government and Opposition, were dissatisfied with the Government 
attitude. 38 In February 1959, Sir David Robertson, a Conservative Member. 
of Parliament, moved a motion asking the Government for a further investi-
gation of the case. The motion, which was sponsored by 150 Members of 
Parliament of all parties, read: 
That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to set up 
a Select Committee of this House to inquire into the case of 
John Waters and to advise this House Mhether the said John 
Waters was assaulted by certain police off~cers as alleged, 
and in what circumstances it was decided that no.prosecution 
should be instituted~39 
Prime Minister Macmillan made a statement to the Commons in the foll0w-
ing terms: 
It is an established principle of Government in this country ••• 
that the decision as to whether any citizen should be prose-
cuted or whether any prosecution should be discontinued, should 
be a matter where a public as opposed to a private prosecution 
is concerned, for the prosecuting authority to decide on the 
merits of the case without political or other pressure •••• Never-
theless, although this principle must stand, there is a second 
which cannot be ignored. Considerable disquiet has been ex-
pressed both inside and outside the House over this affair and 
public confidence has been correspondingly disturbed. The 
Government have, therefore, felt it right there ~hould be some 
form of inquiry ••• 40 
Eventually, a Tribunal of Inquiry was created under the Tribunals of 
Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1926 to make further investigations. From 
March 17 to March 22, the Tribunal, which included the senior judge of 
38591 HJ C. Debates, 5 s., col. 191; 599 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 
351, 354, 983. 
39600 H. c. Debates, 5 s., col. 31. 
40ibid., cols. 31-32. 
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the Court of Session in Edinburgh, the rector of Aberdeen Grammar School, 
and the President of the Law Society of Scotland, heard: thirty-six 
witnesses at six meetings. The report, submitted by the Tribunal on 
April 16, concluded that John Waters was an extremely cheeky boy and on 
the occasion in question his behavior and language could only be de-
scribed as shocking; but that Mr. Gunn had struck him. Mr. Gunn's be-
havior, the report went on, was unquestionable blameworthy. The Tribunal 
freed the other constable and the local public prosecutors from blame. 
In April 1963, there were so many allegations and rumors touching 
the interests of Mr. T. G.D. Galbraith, who was then Under-Secretary of 
State for Scotland, but had been Civil Lord of the Admiralty when Mr. 
William John Vassall was an Admiralty clerk, that Mr. Galbraith tendered 
his resignation to Prime Minister Macmillan. The First Lord_ of the 
Admiralty, Lord Carrington, and several officials of the Admiralty were 
also involved in the Vassall Spy Case. 
The Government agreed to set up the Radcliffe Tribunal, including a 
small number of Privy Councilors, because the Opposition had applied 
heavy pressure upon the Government. The Tribunal found that the Minis-
ters and the officials concerned were blamless, except an Admiralty 
official who was now dead. Moreover, the report of the Tribunal, while 
criticizing the system by which the Admiralty selected Mr. Vassall for 
his post, gave a most detailed account of how Mr. Vassall supplied secret 
information to the Russians when he served at the British Embassy as the 
naval attache's clerk, and later when he was in the Admiralty in London. 41 
If the Government keeps its majority, and refuses to accept the form 
41The Times (London), April 26, 1963, p. 18. 
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of inquiry or investigation asked by the Opposition, there is no further 
recourse. The Profumo Affair indicates this point rather definitely. 
Before the debate on the Profumo scandal, Prime Minister Macmillan 
disclosed that, on June 1, 1963, under Mr. Wilson's persistent demands, he 
had ordered an investigation of the security aspects of the scandal by 
Lord Dilhorne, the Lord Chancellor. At the Cabinet meeting, Mr. Mac-
millan presented the Dilhorne report. While the report was not made 
public, the Government said that Lord Dilhorne had found no security 
42 breach and no attempt to blackmail Mr. Profumo. 
On the debate of the scandal, Mr. George Brown, the Deputy Leader 
of the Opposition, called for the appointment of a Select Committee of 
the House to conduct further investigation of the scandal: what Mr. 
Brown suspected was that various Departments had received bits of infor-
mation which, if put together, would have made a dark and worrisome 
picture. Mr. Macleod, the Deputy Prime Minister, wondered whether it 
might not be better to take another look at the Prime Minister's idea, 
after the Vassall Spy Case, of referring the affair to a small number of 
Privy Councilors. "No: 11 the Opposition Members of Parliament shouted. 
Perhaps to be followed, Mr. Macleod continued, by an independent judiciary. 
"No! No!" they yelled again. 43 
After the debate, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Wilson (the Leader of the 
Opposition) failed to agree in two meetings on the form of a further 
inquiry into the security aspects of the scandal. On June 21, Mr. Macmillan 
42 Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 13, 1963, p. 3; New York Times, 
June 14, 1963, p. l; and ibid., June 17, 1963, p. 3. 
43 
The Times (London), June 18, 1963, p. 7. 
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announced in the Corrnnons that a judicial inquiry would be conducted by 
Lord Denning, the Master of Rolls. Mr. Wilson denounced the form of 
inquiry as inadequate. He reaffirmed that it should be conducted by a 
select Committee of the House, or by a tribunal of inquiry. Lord Dennings 
term of reference, according to Mr. Macmillan, would be: 
To examine, in the light of the circumstances leading to the 
resignation of the former Secretary of State for War, Mr. J. 
D. Profumo, the operation of the security service and ade-
quacy of their cooperation with the police in matters of 
security; l'o investigate any information or material that may 
come to his attention in this connection; and To consider any 
evidence there may be for believing that national securi.ty has 
been, or may be, endangered; and To report thereon.44 
General Debate 
Debates in the Commons provide the occasion for another method of 
enforcing ministerial responsibility. The Government must meet the 
Opposition on the floor-and in the lobby of the Corrnnons. Although the 
Opposition challenge normally appears doomed to failure, the Opposition 
has one of its best opportunities to "swing the pendulum" in the corning 
parliamentary elections. 
Debates in the Commons may occur on several occasions. The first 
business of a parliamentary session is what is known as the Debate on the 
Address. In January 1924, as already pointed out before, the Baldwin 
Government was defeated on the Debate of the Address. The Corrnnons may 
debate the Estimates address of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which is 
called the "26 Parliamentary days on estimates of expenditure." The 
Opposition may move a reduction in a Minister's salary as its criticis:rn. 
This happened in April 1959, but the Opposition's motion was rejected by 
44rbid., June 22, 1963, p. 8. 
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45 
195 votes to 146. The second reading of a Bill also gives opportunity 
£qr a debate on the principle of the Bill. In this debate, a motion that 
"the Bill be given its second reading this day six months," or (in the 
latter part of the session) that "the Bill be given its second reading 
this day three months" may be tabled by the Opposition. For instance, when 
the Street Offences Bill was bei_ng considered in the Commons, a motion that 
"the Bill be given its second reading this day six months" was moved by 
the Opposition. The motion, again, was defeated by 235 votes to 88.46 
Other debates, like those on foreign policy and defense, may occur, and a 
division may follow. At the end of the debate on the breakdown of the 
Common Market negotiations, for instance, the Opposition's amendment of 
"no confidence" was rejected by a vote of 333 to 227. 47 · In March 1963, the 
Opposition's amendment of "no eon:fidence" in the Government's defense poli-
48 
cy was defeated by 333 votes to 237. · The Government's decision to 
accept an offer from the United States of Polaris_missl~s for nuclear 
submarines instead of Skybolt missles for aircraft was carried by a smash-
49 
ing majority (94) against bitter criticisms of the Opposition. 
The main debates which take place in the Commons, as one m~ght expect, 
are dominated by the two Front Benches. For instance, when the Suez 
policy of Mr. Eden's Government was under heavy bombardment of the Opposi-
tion, Mr. Gaitskell, speaking as the Leader of the Opposition, developed 
45 604 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1,471, 1,598. 
46598 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 1,384. 
47Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 14, 1963, p. 3. 
48 
Ibid., March 7, 1963, p. 3. 
49 Ibid., February 7, 1963, p. 5. 
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a three-fold criticism of the Government's conduct of the Suez Affair. 
He accused the Government of having injured tq.e solidarity of the 
Commonwealth; of damaging Anglo-American relations; and of ignoring 
British obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Eden 
defended the Government's policy on the ground that a nation was fully 
entitled to act in the interests of its own nationals and its own shipping 
independently of other states. 50 On June 17, 1963, when Prime Minister 
Macmillan was attacked by the Opposition with a vigor that has seldom 
been surpassed, Mr. Wilson, the Leader of the Opposition, accused Mr. 
Macmillan of gambling on the chance that the issue would never see the 
light of day. He acquitted him of complicity, but not of "a grave dere-
liction of duty." Mr. Macmillan admitted that although he was aware of 
"rumors" about Mr. Profumo's affair, he had concluded from statements 
made to him by Profumo that it "did not involve any security,"_and that he 
had no occasion to doubt Mr. Profumo's word. "I would ask the House," he 
said, "what alternative I had except to believe what I was told." ''My 
colleagues and I have been deceived--grossly deceived-- •.• " were his 
closing words on the unhappy debate. He still felt himself entitled to 
the "sympathetic understanding and confidence of the Commons and the 
country. 1151 
The Prime Minister is exposed constantly to devastating criticisms 
from the Opposition for Government decisions or lack of decisions. In the 
winter of 1959, for example, Prime Minister Macmillan called the agree-
ment which had been reached with Greece and Turkey on the future of Cyprus 
50558 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 1,451, 1,454-1,458. 
SlThe Times (London), June 18, 1963, pp. 6-7. 
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"a victory for reason and cooperation." Mr. Gaitskell, the Leader of the 
Opposition, said that Mr. Macmillan's Government deserved "particular 
credit for eating so many words and even inviting Archbishop Makarios to 
the Conference." Mr. Macmillan_protested that the expressions of Mr. 
Gaitskell "were of the tone and temper that I expected from the narrow-
ness of his outlook. He never has been, and never will be, able to rise 
to the level of great events. 1152 
Sometimes, the Prime Minister may have to put up with inhumane, 
harsh words. For instance, when Prime Minister Eden was opening a debate 
on the Suez Incident, Mrs. Braddock, a Labor Member of Parliament, inter-
rupted: · 53 "You are a lot of hypocrites, the whole lot of you!" Mr. Wilson 
once told the Commons: "That hon. Gentleman (i.e., Prime Minister Mac-
millan) is the only statesman of this country to claim, with character-
istic modesty, to embody all that is best in both Disraeli and Gladstone. 
In fact, of course, he is wrong. He has inherited the streak of 
charlatanry in Disraeli without his vision, and the self-righteousness of 
Gladstone without his dedication to principle, 1154 
The Prime Minister, as the head of the Government, must answer argu-
ment by argument to explain and defend Her Majesty's Government. Of 
course, he must be able to persuade enough supporters to win the division 
if it occurs. The arguments of the Opposition are naturally very per-
suasive. Every Prime Minis.ter should be competent to handle himself 
effectively in the give and take of debate in the Commons. It is probably 
52 · · 600 H. C. Debates, 5 s., cols. 623-624. 
53 . 
The Times (London), November 1, 1956, p. 4. 
54 594 H. C. Debates, 5 s., col. 628. 
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true that one of the most familiar generalizations about the holder of the 
Prime Ministership is that he is a man whose high standing in political 
life has been earned through years of service to the Co1IIII1ons and his party. 
A General de Gaulle or General Eisenhower type of "hero-politician" could 
never dream of entering No. 10 Downing Street. British Prime Ministers 
generally have been long-time members of the lower House before they have 
assumed the office of Prime Minister. For instance: Arthur J. Balfour 
for 28 years; Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 38 years, Herbert H. Asquith, 22 
years, Stanley Baldwin, 15 years; David Lloyd George, 26 years; Ramsay 
MacDonald, 18 years; ~eville Chamberlain, 19 years; Winston Churchill, 40 
years; Clement Attlee, 22 years; Anthony Eden, 32 years; and Harold Mac-
millan, 31 years. 
Su1I1II1ary 
Due to the fusion of legislative and executive powers through the 
tightly-organized party system, the absolute legislative power of Parlia-
ment has become vested in the Prime Minister and his colleagues. One need 
only briefly examine the priority of the Government's business and the 
voting pattern in the Co1I1II1ons to see how true this is. It goes without 
saying that the Prime Minister does not (and cannot) p~rsonally draft 
Government Bills and steer them through all stages of the parliamentary 
process. He delegates this power to his colleagues. However, the Prime 
Minister, in some cases, actually acts as the Leader of the Co1I1II1ons. 
The Prime Minister (and his colleagues), as the Leader of the House 
of Co1I1II1ons and the head of. the Government, must attend the House of Commons 
at Question Time and during major debates; here the Government defends and 
explains, while the Opposition attacks and questions. The role of the 
Opposition is to wait for the Government to make mistakes and then to pounce 
upon its leadership. The vivid interplay between the Government, with 
its solid but not permanent mrujtority, and the Opposition, which is 
strong, united, and vigorous, is the masterpiece of British political 
genius. In addition, the Prime Minister is politically responsible to 
provide the Commons necessary information through parliamentary inquiry 
and investigation. 
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The persistent challenge and criticisms of the Opposition, which are 
supposed to make the Government behave more reasonably, have only slight 
influence on the general policies of the Government, but they do exact a 
rendering of accounts and full discussion. The Prime Minister in particular 
and his colleagues in general must treat their opponents (as well as their 
supporters) with unceasing persuasion and mutual understanding. They have 
to keep an eye on the "floating voter," because their claim of master-
ship over the Commons must be sanctioned at the polls at least every five 
years. They not only must attract the loyalty of voters in parliamentary 
elections; they must assume the brunt of Government responsibility upon 
themselves. This is essential to the success and survival of British 
parliamentary democracy. 
CHAPTER III 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Under the British system of party government, the policy of 
Parliament is determined by the Government; the Government's policy is 
in turn determined by the Prime Minister in his capacity as the leader 
of the parliamentary majority and head of the Cabinet. In discharging 
the supreme legislative decision-making role, the Prime Minister must 
conform to established constitutional conventions, but the power of 
ultimate decision-making rests solely upon his shoulders. If things go 
well, he and his party may claim the right by electoral mandate to govern 
the nation. For blunders committed by his Government, the Prime Minister 
bears primary responsibility to his party and the public, which makes his 
tenure as Leader extremely hazardous. 
The Prime Minister, as the Party Leader of the parliamentary majority 
in the House of Commons, commands the votes required to pass his legisla-
tive program. Members of Parliament are individually so well disciplined 
by party loyalty that nothing short of an act of political suicide--with-
drawal from the party and resignation of the parliamentary seat--would in-
duce them to defy the party whip. Moreover, Ministers of the Crown hold 
their posts at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Other positive and 
effective means of pressure, such as dissolution of the Commons and nomi-
nation of prospective parliamentary candidates are availabtr;LLto the Prime 
Minister. 
Under ordinary circumstances, "political non-conformism" in the 
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House of Corrnnons bears, more or less, analogy to "political hara kiri." 
This seems to be the first lesson of a British political career, for 
survival is the basic law of politics. No British politician can ignore 
that he normally has no political future outside of one of the two major 
political parties. The resultant cohesion of the British parliamentary 
party makes the enactment of Government policy in the House of Corrnnons 
possible. If parties in the Corrnnons were mere "dancers in a vast 
Virg;i;nia reel," the Prime Minister's supreme legislative decision-making 
role would become an "empty formula," and the function of the Opposition 
would fall into abeyance, Were the Prime Minister in the exercise of his 
legislative leadership, to make a judicious mixture of partisanship and 
bipartisanship or non-partisanship, the essence of constitutional govern-
ment at Westminster would be rendered nugatory. 
The corrnnanding role from which the Prime Minister exercises his 
capacity as the majority Party Leader in the Corrnnons is not without its 
~wesome responsibilities. If he is to enjoy the confidence of his party, 
especially its leading figures (i.e., Ministers of the Crown), the Prime 
Minister must hold the consensus of the public and protect his party's 
mandate to govern. h He must never become a political liability to is party 
by imperiling the chances of the parliamentary membership to retain its 
seats in the Corrnnons. A Party Leader who suffers a resounding loss of 
public image will undermine the vote getting appeal of his party and 
threaten the political careers of his parliamentary colleagues. He will 
alienate the support of the press and forfeit financial contributions from 
the formerly sympathetic groups and individuals who saw in the party a 
defense of their interests. In his role as the Party Leader, the Prime 
Minister must lead effectively or he will soon lose the confidence of his 
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party and its electorate. Such a loss of confidence would lead inevitably 
to the forced resignation or removal of the Leader. 
So long as the leader of the party in office can command his party 
stalwarts and sell his leadership to the majority of his party, it is his 
right to be master of Parliament during its legal term. This does not 
implyy that the Prime Minister may behave a,rbiill:m;r-,rd:J;y towards the Opposition 
or commit outrages against the British sense of propriety. He must not 
drive the Opposition into violent resistence or lose the quality of 
legitimate governor by abusing his parliamentary prerogatives and powers. 
Her Ma:jesty's Opposition permits the Prime Minister to be master of Parlia-
ment because the latter permits the former to oppose. The Prime Minister 
as a reasonable master of Parliament, must be able to persuade his opponents 
as much or more than his supporters into accepting his leadership. 
In the main debates and question periods, the Prime Minister and his 
colleagues must be able to explain and defend effectively the general 
policies of the Government. The Leader of the Opposition and his followers, 
on the other hand, seek every chance to air grievances against the policy 
and proposals of the Government. In order to make a good impression upon 
the electorate outside, the Opposition has to oppose responsibly. The 
electorate, as a whole., has one of its best opportunities to compare the 
effectiveness of the Government's and Opposition's leadership. Election-
eering is going on every day. The British constitution,does not allow the 
electorate to change the powers of the office of Prime Minister, but it 
does allow it to change the person who exercises the powers. The Prime 
Minister must go to the country at least every five years. If he is de-
feated at the polls, he and his party must resign. 
Great Britai.n has combined strong government with responsible 
legislative leadership. The days are gone when one could say that the 
Queen-in-Parliament might provide for the execution of all blue-eyed 
babies. The Prime Minister leads a Government which is powerful enough 
to monopolize the legislative authority of Parliament, but the Prime 
Minister (as well as his colleagues), on the other hand, is politically 
required to assume the responsibilities of leadership to his party, to 
the House of Commons, and to the electorate. He is in no sense a dic-
tator. Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Madison expressed grave doubts 
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about the propriety of entrusting the powers of legislation and execu-
tion of the law to one man or body of men. If they were still alive, the 
achievement of constitutionalism by the British system of party govern-
ment would come to them as a shocking surprise. 
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THE PRIME MINISTERS SINCE 1902 
P.tfme Minister Tenure of Office Government Govt.Majority 
Arthur J, Balfour Jul.1902-Jan,1906 Unionist 134 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman Jan,1906-Apr.1908 Liberal 356 
Herbert H. Asquith Apr.1908-Jan.1910 Liberal 356 
Herbert H. Asquith Jan.1910-Dec.1910 Liberal 124 
Herbert H. Asquith Dec.1910-May 1915 Liberal 126 
Herbert H. Asquith May 1915-Dec.1916 Coalition 418 
David Lloyd George Dec,1916-Dec.1~18 Coalition 418 
David Lloyd George Dec.1918-0ct.1922 Coalition 427 
Bonar Law Oct.1922-May 1923 Conservative 77 
Stanley Baldwin May 1923-Jan.1924 Conservative Minority Govt. 
Ramsey .MacDonald Jan.1924-Nov.1924 Labor-Liberal 85 
Stanley Baldwin Nov.1924-May 1929 Conservative 223 
Ramsey MacDonald May 1929-Nov.1931 Labor-Liberal 79 
Ramsey MacDonald Nov.1931-Jun.1935 Coalition 501 
Stanley Baldwin Jun.1935-May 1937 Coalition 289 
Neville Chamberlain May 1937-Sept.1939 Coalition 289 
Neville Chamberlain Sept.1939-May 1940 War 247 
Winston Churchill May 1940-May 1945 Coalition 597 
Winston Churchill May 1945-Jul.1945 Conservative 247 
Clement Attlee Jul.1945-Feb.1950 Labor 148 
Clement Attlee Feb.1950-0ct.1951 Labor 5 
Winston Churchill Oct.1951-Apr.1955 Conservative 17 
Anthony Eden Apr.1955-Jan.1957 Conservative 60 
Harold Macmillan Jan.1957-0ct.1959 Conservative 60 
Harold Macmillan Oct.1959-0ct,1963 Conservative 100 
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APPENDIX B 
CAUSES OF RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTERS, 1902-1963 
Prime Minister Term of Office --- Cause of Resignation 
Salisbury 1895 - 1902 Retirement 
Balfour 1902 - 1906 Defeat at the Polls 
Campbell-BanneFman 1906 - 1908 Retirement 
Asquith 1908 - 1916 Internal dissension 
Lloyd George 1916 - 1922 End of Coalition and Internal 
Dissension 
Bonar Law 1922 - 1923 Retirement 
Baldwin 1923 1924 Defeat in the House of Commons 
MacDonald 1924 - 1924 Defeat at the Polls 
Baldwin 1924 - 1929 Defeat at the Polls 
MacDonald 1929 - 1935 Retirement 
Baldwin 1935 - 1937 Retirement 
Chamberlain 1937 - 1940 Loss of support without defeat 
Churchill 1940 - 1945 End of Coalition - Defeat at 
the Polls 
Attlee 1945 - 1951 Defeat at the Polls 
Churchill 1951 - 1955 Retirement 
Eden 1955 - 1957 Loss of support without defeat 
and Retirement 
Macmillan 1957 - 1963 Retirement 
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